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I. INTRODUCTION
Patty Plaintiff was driving on a Pennsylvania road when Denny
Defendant ran a red light and struck Plaintiffs vehicle, causing
Patty to lose control of her car and strike a pole. Patty sustained
injuries to her neck, back, and face. She subsequently sued Denny
for damages, including lost wages, lost future earning capacity,
pain and suffering, loss of ability to enjoy the pleasures of life, and
scarring and embarrassment. In addition, Patty's husband filed a
claim against Denny for loss of consortium. Denny's counsel con-
ceded Denny's negligence, leaving only the amount and extent of
damages at issue. In the discovery phase of litigation, Patty
claimed that she could no longer participate in certain physical
activities because of her injured neck and back and that her en-
joyment of life had been impaired. In addition, Patty's husband
claimed that he no longer takes pleasure in his wife's companion-
ship and affection since the accident. While deposing Patty, Den-
ny's counsel found out that Patty has a Facebook account and a
Twitter account. However, certain content on Patty's Facebook
account is available only to those people whom Patty designates as
a "friend," while other information is available for anyone to see.
The information on her Twitter account is private: only users
whom Patty allows to "follow" her can view it.
A week after Patty's deposition, Denny's attorney found that the
public portion of Patty's Facebook account featured a profile pic-
ture of Patty and her husband riding a brand new rollercoaster at
the local amusement park. Unbeknownst to Denny's counsel, the
private portion of Patty's Facebook account contains more pictures
of Patty enjoying physical activities, and her private "status up-
dates" and "tweets" indicate that she had recently participated in
other physical activities and social events. Based on Patty's public
profile picture, Denny's counsel sent Patty additional interrogato-
ries, asking Patty to provide the usernames and passwords to all
of her social media accounts. In addition, Denny's counsel sent
authorizations for Patty to sign that would allow the custodian of
records at the social networking companies to release all of the
information contained on Patty's accounts. Patty's counsel re-
fused, arguing that the requests were not reasonably calculated to
lead to the discovery of admissible evidence; were unduly broad
and burdensome; sought irrelevant information; and would cause
an unreasonable annoyance, burden, and/or embarrassment. In
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response, Defendant's counsel filed a motion to compel the private
social media content, asking the court to order Plaintiff to turn
over her usernames and passwords and to sign the authorizations.
How should a Pennsylvania Court of Common Pleas judge rule
on these matters? Should the judge grant access to the non-public
content, or is it subject to a privacy privilege? Should Denny's
counsel only have access to information from the private accounts
if the public portions share information inconsistent with state-
ments made by Patty, or should Denny be allowed access to all of
Patty's private content regardless of the public content? Who de-
termines whether the information contained on the private por-
tion of the social media accounts are relevant? What if Patty nev-
er shared information with the public, and Denny's counsel had no
idea what information is contained on the private accounts and
bases its requests on a mere suspicion that the accounts contain
relevant information?
Surprisingly, these issues have not been widely litigated in
Pennsylvania. In fact, only thirteen (known) Pennsylvania cases
have addressed some of these issues.' Under the particular cir-
cumstances of each case, at least six trial court judges have or-
dered discovery of private social media content,2 six others have
ruled that the private content was not discoverable,' and one has
1. With the popularity of social media, it is likely that there are many more trial
courts that have decided these issues. This comment discusses the thirteen cases actually
known to the author. For a running "scorecard" of the social media discovery cases, see
Daniel E. Cummins, Facebook Discovery Scorecard, TORT TALK (last updated Dec. 4, 2012),
http://www.torttalk.com/2012/01/facebook-discovery-scorecard.html. On his blog, Attorney
Daniel Cummins provides copies of some of the trial courts' orders and opinions that have
decided the issue and some motions/filings made by the litigants. The blog also provides a
sample motion to compel a plaintiff to produce Facebook log-in information, a proposed
order of court, and a sample brief in support of the motion to compel.
2. Coy-Burt v. Hoskins, No. 090901827 (Pa. Ct. Com. P. Phila. Apr. 28, 2010) (order
granting defendant's motion for reconsideration of defendant's motion to compel); McMillen
v. Hummingbird Speedway, Inc., No. 113-2010 CD, 2010 Pa. Dist. & Cnty. Dec. LEXIS 270
(Pa. Ct. Com. Pl. Jefferson Sept. 9, 2010) (opinion and order granting defendant's motion to
compel); Zimmerman v. Weis Mkts., Inc., No. CV-09-1535, 2011 Pa. Dist. & Cnty. Dec.
LEXIS 187 (Pa. Ct. Com. Pl. Northumberland May 19, 2011) (opinion and order granting
defendant's motion to compel); Largent v. Reed, No. 2009-1823, 2011 WL 5632688 (Pa. Ct.
Com. Pl. Franklin Nov. 8, 2011) (opinion and order granting defendant's motion to compel);
Gallagher v. Urbanovich, No. 2010-33418 (Pa. Ct. Com. Pl. Montgomery Feb. 27, 2012)
(order granting plaintiffs motion to compel); Mazzarella v. Mount Airy #1, No. 1798 Civil
2009 (Pa. Ct. Com. Pl. Monroe Nov. 7, 2012) (order granting defendant's motion to compel).
3. Kennedy v. Norfolk S. Corp., No. 100201473, 2011 WL 7110212 (Pa. Ct. Com. Pl.
Phila. Jan. 4, 2011) (order denying defendant's motion to strike plaintiffs objections to
supplemental interrogatories); Piccolo v. Paterson, No. 2009-04979, 2011 Pa. Dist. & Cnty.
Dec. LEXIS 45 (Pa. Ct. Com. Pl. Bucks May 5, 2011) (order denying defendant's motion to
compel); Kalinowski v. Kirschenheiter, No. 2010-06779 (Pa. Ct. Com. Pl. Luzerne Aug. 8,
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ruled that the private content contained on one of the plaintiffs
social media accounts was discoverable, while the private content
contained on her other two other accounts were not.4 Seemingly, a
heavyweight bout is taking place between personal injury attor-
neys and defense attorneys in Pennsylvania.' To date, neither
party has suffered a knockout blow, as Pennsylvania's appellate
courts have yet to deliver a general rule on the scope of social me-
dia discovery.' Eventually, a Pennsylvania appellate court will
need to decide the scope of social media discovery because, to date,
Pennsylvania trial courts that have decided the issue have cir-
cumvented Pennsylvania Rules of Civil Procedure and have not
adhered to the typical way discovery is conducted. These trial
courts have permitted litigants unfettered access to all of an op-
ponents' social media content, including private information that
might be completely irrelevant or embarrassing.
Should an appellate court decide to take on the issue, the out-
come could have a far-reaching impact on litigation. As the use of
social media continues to grow,' social media accounts will become
2011) (order denying defendant's motion to compel but ordering plaintiff to preserve pre-
sent Facebook or Myspace pages); Arcq v. Fields, No. 2008-2430 (Pa. Ct. Com. Pl. Franklin
Dec. 7, 2011) (opinion and order denying defendant's motion to compel); Martin v. Allstate
Fire & Casualty Ins. Co., No. 110402438 (Pa. Ct. Com. Pl. Phila. Dec. 13, 2011) (order deny-
ing defendant's motion to compel); Trail v. Lesko, No. GD-10-017249, 2012 WL 2864004
(Pa. Ct. Com. Pl. Allegheny July 5, 2012) (order and opinion denying both plaintiffs and
defendant's motions to compel).
4. Simms v. Lewis, No. 11961 CD 2011, 2012 WL 6755098 (Pa. Ct. Com. P1. Indiana
Oct. 10, 2012) (opinion and order granting in part and denying in part defendant's motion
to compel).
5. See Ben Present, Plaintiffs Score a Pair of Wins in Social Media Decisions, THE
LEGAL INTELLIGENCER (Dec. 20, 2011) (LEXIS, Legal Intelligencer); Ben Present, Plaintiffs
Win Round on Discovery of Facebook Pages, THE LEGAL INTELLIGENCER (Jan. 3, 2012)
(LEXIS, Legal Intelligencer).
6. One reason that an appellate court probably has not decided the issue yet is be-
cause "[glenerally, a party can appeal only after entry of a final order, and an order compel-
ling discovery is not a final order." Gormley v. Edgar, 995 A.2d 1197, 1200 (Pa. Super. Ct.
2010) (citing Jones v. Faust, 852 A.2d 1201, 1203 (Pa. Super. Ct. 2004)). Under certain
situations, though, an interlocutory discovery order may be considered a collateral order
and appealable under PA. R. APP. P. 313. Id.; see also Feldman v. Ide, 915 A.2d 1208, 1210-
11 (Pa. Super. Ct. 2007) ("In order for an interlocutory order to be deemed collateral, there
must be an order collateral to the main cause of action; the right involved must be too im-
portant for review to be denied; and the question presented must be such that if review is
postponed until final judgment the claim will be irreparably lost." (quoting Ben v.
Schwartz, 729 A.2d 547, 550 (Pa. 1999))).
7. Facebook's website indicates that it currently has over 901 million active monthly
users. Key Facts-Facebook Newsroom,
http://newsroom.fb.com/content/default.aspx?NewsAreald=22 (last visited June 12, 2012).
Twitter currently has over 140 million users. Twitter Turns Six, TWITTER BLOG (Mar. 21,
2012, 10:18 AM), http/blog.twitter.com/2012/03/twitter-turns-six.html. Myspace current-
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an increasing concern for practicing attorneys, as more will begin
to acknowledge that accounts may contain very relevant infor-
mation and request the non-public content in discovery. Moreo-
ver, attorneys need to be aware that clients use social media and
should advise them that information contained on the social media
sites can be used against them.'
This Comment begins by examining the Pennsylvania Court of
Common Pleas' decisions on whether private social media content
is discoverable. The Comment will then set forth the factors that
Pennsylvania courts should consider when deciding the proper
scope of private social media discovery and discuss the proper
methods of discovering the private content.'
II. THE PENNSYLVANIA COURT OF COMMON PLEAS' LEGAL
HISTORY ON THE DISCOVERY OF PRIVATE SOCIAL MEDIA CONTENT
Generally, in Pennsylvania, "a party may obtain discovery re-
garding any matter, not privileged, which is relevant to the sub-
ject matter involved in the pending action, whether it relates to
the claim or defense of the party seeking discovery or to the claim
or defense of any other party . . . ."t The discovery requests must
appear to be "reasonably calculated to lead to the discovery of ad-
missible evidence."n As such, it follows that, as long as the infor-
mation sought may be considered relevant and is not privileged, it
generally is discoverable. Thus, Pennsylvania has liberal discov-
ly has over 25 million users. Wikipedia, httpJ/en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Myspace (last visited
June 12, 2012).
8. Sashe D. Dimitroff, Social Media and Discovery, THE ROLE OF TECHNOLOGY IN
EVIDENCE COLLECTION (2011), available at 2011 WL 2941026, 3 ("Social networks repre-
sent a potential treasure trove of information for a litigant. As such, attorneys should al-
ways consider seeking discovery of the social networks of opposing parties or third parties.
By equal measure, attorneys should consider what potentially relevant or damaging infor-
mation exists on their clients' social media sites.").
9. The use of content gained from an opponent's social media page as evidence and the
authentication of this evidence is beyond the scope of this Comment. For an insightful
article on this issue, see Heather L. Griffith, Understanding and Authenticating Evidence
from Social Networking, 7 WASH. J. L. TECH. & ARTS 209 (2012).
10. PA. R. Civ. P. 4003.1(a).
11. PA. R. Civ. P. 4003.1(b). Under PA. R. CIv. P. 4011,
[n]o discovery . .. shall be permitted which (a) is sought in bad faith; (b) would cause
unreasonable annoyance, embarrassment, oppression, burden or expense to the de-
ponent or any person or party; (c) is beyond the scope of discovery as set forth in
Rules 4003.1 through 4003.6; (d) is prohibited by any law barring disclosure of medi-
ation communications and mediation documents; or (e) would require the making of
an unreasonable investigation by the deponent or any party or witness.
Id.
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ery rules.12 Pennsylvania trial courts have debated whether re-
quests for signed authorizations consenting to the release of pri-
vate content and for a user's log-in information are reasonably
calculated to lead to the discovery of admissible evidence, whether
the information sought would be relevant, and whether the pri-
vate content should be considered confidential and/or privileged.
To date, only a small number of trial courts have decided the is-
sue, and the decisions have fallen on both sides of the discovery
fence. To boot, only six Court of Common Pleas judges have is-
sued opinions along with their orders granting or denying the dis-
covery requests." Although the decisions have been mixed, one
general rule seems to be emerging from the trial courts' written
opinions. This approach, referred to as the "threshold rule,"14 re-
quires that the party requesting the private content make a
threshold showing that the public portions of the user's social me-
dia account contain relevant information or that another good
faith basis for requesting the information exists." Otherwise, the
12. See PECO Energy Co. v. Ins. Co. of N. Am., 852 A.d 1230, 1233 (Pa. Super. Ct.
2004); George v. Schirra, 814 A.2d 202, 204 (Pa. Super. Ct. 2002).
13. Four of the unpublished court opinions are discussed in the text of this Comment.
Judge Wettick of the Allegheny County Court of Common Pleas and Judge Bianco of the
Indiana Court of Common Pleas issued their opinions and orders on this matter after a
majority of this Comment was written; therefore, their opinions are only briefly discussed
in footnotes at the end of this Comment. See Trail v. Lesko, No. GD-10-017249, 2012 WL
2864004 (Pa. Ct. Com. Pl. Allegheny July 5, 2012) (order and opinion denying both plain-
tiffs and defendant's motions to compel), discussed infra note 240; Simms v. Lewis, No.
11961 CD 2011, 2012 WL 6755098 (Pa. Ct. Com. Pl. Indiana Oct. 10, 2012), discussed infra
note 240. The other cases in which a trial court only issued an order unaccompanied by an
opinion are discussed in footnotes, as they are less persuasive. Judge Williamson of the
Monroe County Court of Common Pleas issued an order granting a plaintiffs motion to
compel discovery of private social media content after a majority of this Comment was
completed; therefore, the facts of the case are not included in the footnotes. See Mazzarella
v. Mount Airy #1, No. 1798 Civil 2009 (Pa. Ct. Com. Pl. Monroe Nov. 7, 2012) (order grant-
ing plaintiffs motion to compel stating, "Plaintiffs argument of an expectation of privacy
regarding her use of social media is misplaced. Those who elect to use social media, and
place things on the internet for viewing, sharing and use with others, waives an expecta-
tion of privacy").
14. James P. Goslee, Litigants Need to Exercise Extreme Caution When Posting to So-
cial Networking Sites, JETLAw (Apr. 13, 2012), www.jetlaw.orgp=11217.
15. See, e.g., McMillen v. Hummingbird Speedway, Inc., No. 113-2010 CD, 2010 Pa.
Dist. & Cnty. Dec. LEXIS 270 (Pa. Ct. Com. PI. Jefferson Sept. 9, 2010) (opinion and order
granting defendant's motion to compel); Zimmerman v. Weis Mkts., Inc., No. CV-09-1535,
2011 Pa. Dist. & Cnty. Dec. LEXIS 187 (Pa. Ct. Com. Pl. Northumberland May 19, 2011)
(opinion and order granting defendant's motion to compel); Largent v. Reed, No. 2009-1823,
2011 WL 5632688 (Pa. Ct. Com. Pl. Franklin Nov. 7, 2011) (opinion and order granting
defendant's motion to compel); Simms v. Lewis, No. 11961 CD 2011, 2012 WL 6755098 (Pa.
Ct. Com. Pl. Indiana Oct. 10, 2012) (opinion and order granting in part and denying in part
defendant's motion to compel).
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user's private social media content is not discoverable.16 However,
at least two trial courts have apparently taken a less restrictive
approach and allowed discovery of private content without requir-
ing any threshold showing of relevance in the user's publicly view-
able information. 7 In addition, at least two trial courts have de-
clined to order the discovery of private social media content, even
though the public content may arguably have been considered rel-
evant. 8
McMillen v. Hummingbird Speedway, Inc. marked the first case
in which a Pennsylvania Court of Common Pleas judge issued an
opinion accompanying an order that granted a defendant's motion
to compel discovery of a plaintiffs social media user names and
passwords." In McMillen, the plaintiff allegedly sustained inju-
16. Arcq v. Fields, No. 2008-2430 (Pa. Ct. Com. Pl. Franklin Dec. 7, 2011) (opinion and
order denying defendant's motion to compel).
17. See, e.g., Goslee, supra note 14 (discussing Gallagher v. Urbanovich, No. 2010-
33418 (Pa. Ct. Com. Pl. Montgomery Feb. 27, 2012) (order granting plaintiffs motion to
compel); see also Coy-Burt v. Hoskins, No. 090901827 (Pa. Ct. Com. Pl. Phila. Apr. 28,
2010) (order granting defendant's motion for reconsideration of defendant's motion to com-
pel), discussed infra, note 19.
18. But see, e.g., Kennedy v. Norfolk S. Corp., No. 100201473, 2011 WL 7110212 (Pa.
Ct. Com. Pl. Phila. Jan. 4, 2011) (order denying defendant's motion to strike plaintiffs
objections to supplemental interrogatories), discussed infra note 38; Kalinowski v.
Kirschenheiter, No. 2010-06779 (Pa. Ct. Com. Pl. Luzerne Aug. 8, 2011) (order denying
defendant's motion to compel but ordering plaintiff to preserve present Facebook or
Myspace pages), discussed infra note 86.
19. No. 113-2010 CD, 2010 Pa. Dist. & Cnty. Dec. LEXIS 270 (Pa. Ct. Com. Pl. Jeffer-
son Sept. 9, 2010) (opinion and order granting defendant's motion to compel). Before
McMillen was decided, at least one other Pennsylvania trial court considered the discover-
ability of private social media content. See Coy-Burt, at No. 090901827.
In Coy-Burt, Judge Allen of the Philadelphia County Court of Common Pleas or-
dered the plaintiff to execute an authorization to release private Facebook information to
Facebook's custodian of records. Id. However, Judge Allen's order was not accompanied
with a written opinion. The judge initially denied the motion to compel, Coy-Burt, No.
090901827 (Pa. Ct. Com. Pl. Phila. Mar. 17, 2010), but then granted the defendant's motion
for reconsideration after the proposed order added a provision that required the private
Facebook content be subject to a confidentiality agreement between the parties. Coy-Burt,
No. 090901827 (Pa. Ct. Com. Pl. Phila. Apr. 28, 2010) (order granting defendant's motion
for reconsideration of defendant's motion to compel). This author is unaware of the oral
arguments made at motion's court, but copies of defense counsel's motion for reconsidera-
tion and memorandum of law in support of its motion for reconsideration indicate that the
defendant never made an initial showing of relevant information contained on the plain-
tiffs publically viewable Facebook page. See Defendant's Motion for Reconsideration, Coy-
Burt, No. 090901827; Defendant's Memorandum of Law in Support of Motion for Reconsid-
eration, Coy-Burt, No. 090901827. Defense counsel's motion simply indicated that, because
the plaintiff put her physical and mental conditions at issue, the Facebook content was
discoverable under Pennsylvania law because the request was reasonably calculated to lead
to the discovery of admissible evidence relevant to the plaintiffs claims of liability and
damages. Motion for Reconsideration 1 10, Coy-Burt, No. 090901827 (citing Ledbetter v.
Wal-Mart Stores, Inc., No. 06-cv-01958-WYD-MJW, 2009 WL 1067018 (D. Colo. Apr. 21,
793
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ries after the car he drove in a stock car race was struck from be-
hind during a cool-down lap.20 The plaintiff filed suit against the
racetrack, the driver of the vehicle that struck him, and two oth-
ers, alleging "substantial injuries, including possible permanent
impairment, loss and impairment of general health, strength, and
vitality, and inability to enjoy certain pleasures of life."2 1 In its
interrogatories, the racetrack defendant asked the plaintiff
whether he belonged to any social media sites and, if so, to provide
the names of the sites, his usernames, and his passwords.22 The
plaintiff responded that he uses Facebook and Myspace, but that
he would not provide his log-in names or passwords, claiming that
information is confidential.23 After the racetrack defendant
viewed the public portion of the plaintiffs Facebook page and dis-
covered comments the plaintiff made about going on a fishing trip
and attending the Daytona 500, three of the defendants filed a
motion to compel the plaintiff to produce his usernames, log-in
names, and passwords.2 4 Defendants' counsel argued that the pri-
vate portions of the plaintiffs social media pages might contain
further relevant content that could shed light on plaintiffs claims
of damages and injury and possibly impeach and contradict the
plaintiffs claims.2 5 In response, without filing a written brief in
opposition to the motion,2 6 the plaintiff essentially asked the court
to find that the private content on the sites comprised of privileged
communications, which are confidential and protected against dis-
closure.27
The court began its discussion by laying out Pennsylvania's
broad discovery rules and stating that nearly anything relevant is
discoverable because Pennsylvania only recognizes a limited num-
ber of privileges.2 8 The court stated that the legislature has never
2009). Even without the initial showing of relevant public Facebook information in the
motion, the court granted the defendant's motion for reconsideration. Id.




24. Id. at *1-2.
25. Id. at *2.
26. Id.
27. Id. at *3. The plaintiff actually only wanted the court to recognize the plaintiffs
social media content as confidential and protected against disclosure. Id. Instead, the
court stated that because the only information not discoverable under PA. R. CIV. P. 4003.1
is privileged information, the plaintiff was essentially asking the court to recognize a pnvi-
lege for the private social media content. Id.
28. Id. at *2.
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created a privilege for private social media content and that, "[als
a general matter . .. the law disapproves privileges."29 The court
also pointed out that Pennsylvania courts have routinely declined
to grant new privileges.30 Here, the plaintiff was unable to estab-
lish the elements necessary to establish a new privilege. 3 ' The
court reasoned that the Terms and Privacy Policy of Facebook
puts its users "on notice that regardless of their subjective inten-
tions when sharing information, their communications could none-
theless be disseminated by the friends with whom they share it, or
even by Facebook at its discretion."3 2 Likewise, the court ex-
plained that Myspace's Terms and Conditions indicate that
Myspace employees have "unfettered access to a member's com-
munications, and may, with his or her implied consent, scrutinize
those communications at any time and for any reason. For the-
se reasons, the court determined Facebook and Myspace operators'
complete access to a user's social media content negated the plain-
tiffs argument that his communications were confidential.3 4
Ultimately, the court held
Where there is an indication that a person's social network
sites contain information relevant to the prosecution or de-
fense of a lawsuit . . . and given [that Pennsylvania courts]
should allow litigants to utilize "all rational means for ascer-
taining the truth," and the law's general dispreference for the
29. Id. at *3 (citing Joe v. Prison Health Servs., 782 A.2d 24, 31 (Pa. Commw. Ct.
2001)).
30. Id. at *4. "[Olur courts have routinely declined to extend the scope of existing privi-
leges beyond their historical purpose and application or the strictures of the statutory lan-
guage creating them." Id.
31. Id. at *5. The court indicated:
[A] new privilege ought not be recognized unless the claimant can establish four
things: 1) that his communications originated in the confidence that they would not
be disclosed; 2) that the element of confidentiality is essential to fully and satisfacto-
- rily maintain the relationship between the affected parties; 3) community agreement
that the relationship must be sedulously fostered; and 4) that the injury potentially
sustained to the relationship because of the disclosure of the communication out-
weighs the benefit of correctly disposing of litigation.
Id. (citing Matter of Adoption of Embick, 506 A.2d 455, 461 (Pa. Super. Ct. 1986), appeal
denied, 520 A.2d 1385 (Pa. 1987)). The court determined that the plaintiffwas not able to
establish any of the four elements and that any harm that might be realized by the social
network users is "undoubtedly outweighed by the benefit of correctly disposing of litiga-
tion." Id. at *5, *11.
32. Id. at *7.
33. Id. at *8.
34. Id. at *8-9. The court stated, "it is clear that no person choosing Myspace or Face-
book as a communications forum could reasonably expect that his communications would
remain confidential... ." Id. at *9-10.
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allowance of privileges, access to those sites should be freely
granted."
Here, a defendant viewed content on the plaintiffs public Face-
book page that might have shown that the plaintiff exaggerated
his injuries. The court indicated that any lack of injury is clearly
relevant to the plaintiffs claim of damages, and that it is reasona-
ble to assume that the plaintiffs private social media pages may
also contain relevant information regarding the veracity of his in-
juries." Therefore, the court granted the defendants' motion to
compel and ordered the plaintiff to provide his Facebook and
Myspace usernames and passwords to counsel for the defend-
ants.
Relying on McMillen, the next case in which a Pennsylvania
Court of Common Pleas judge issued a comprehensive opinion
along with an order granting a motion to compel discovery of pri-
vate social media content was Zimmerman v. Weis Markets, Inc."
35. Id. at *12 (quoting Koken v. One Beacon Ins. Co., 911 A.2d 1021, 1027 (Pa. Commw.
Ct. 2006)).
36. Id. at *11-12.
37. Id. at *13. The defendants' attorneys were ordered to not divulge the usernames
and passwords to the defendants themselves. Id. The court also ordered the plaintiff to not
delete or alter the existing information contained on his accounts. Id.
38. No. CV-09-1535, 2011 Pa. Dist. & Cnty. Dec. LEXIS 187 (Pa. Ct. Com. Pl. North-
umberland May 19, 2011) (opinion and order granting defendant's motion to compel). Be-
fore Zimmerman and after McMillen, at least two other trial court judges issued orders
denying the discoverability of private social media content. See Kennedy v. Norfolk S.
Corp., No. 100201473, 2011 WL 7110212 (Pa. Ct. Com. Pl. Phila. Jan. 4, 2011) (order deny-
ing defendant's motion to strike plaintiffs objections to supplemental interrogatories);
Piccolo v. Paterson, No. 2009-04979, 2011 Pa. Dist. & Cnty. Dec. LEXIS 45 (Ct. Com. Pl.
Bucks May 5, 2011) (order denying defendant's motion to compel). However, neither order
came with a written opinion. In any event, information regarding these cases can be
gleaned from the parties' briefs and/or news articles.
In Kennedy, the first (known) Pennsylvania trial court to deny discovery of social
media content, the plaintiff brought suit for injuries and economic loss and also made a
claim for loss of life's pleasures after he was involved in an accident. See Defendant's
Memorandum of Law in Support of Its Motion to Strike Objections to Supplemental Inter-
rogatories at 1, Kennedy, No. 100201473, 2010 WL 8357534 (Feb. 2010). In a deposition,
the plaintiff claimed he could no longer go "skeet-shooting" due to the accident; however,
the public portion of his Facebook page allegedly listed "shooting as one of his 'activities.'"
Id. With this information, defense counsel issued supplemental interrogatories requesting
the plaintiff to provide his username, log-in name, and password for all the social network-
ing sites that he used. Id. at 2. The plaintiff objected on the grounds that the request was
made in bad faith and for the purpose of harassing the plaintiff and that the information
requested was outside the scope of discovery. Id. Citing McMillen, defense counsel argued
that "where the publically accessible page of a Plaintiffs Facebook page contains infor-
mation which is relevant to the subject matter of the litigation, the plaintiffs [sic] Facebook
user/log-in name and password are discoverable." Id. (emphasis omitted). The defendant
argued that the Facebook content is relevant to the veracity of the plaintiffs claimed limi-
Summer 2013 Discoverability of Social Media
In Zimmerman, the plaintiff brought suit against the defendant
for injuries he sustained while operating a forklift at the defend-
ant's warehouse." After reviewing the public portion of the plain-
tiffs Facebook page, the defendant discovered that the plaintiffs
"interests" included "ridin" [sic] and "bike stunts."4 0 The public
portion of the plaintiffs Myspace page contained photographs of
the plaintiff wearing shorts in public with his scar from the acci-
dent plainly visible (even though the defendant claimed he did not
wear shorts in public because he was embarrassed by the scar),
photographs of the plaintiff with a black eye before and after the
incident, and photographs of the plaintiff with his motorcycle be-
fore and after the incident."1 Based on this information, the de-
fendant filed a Motion to Compel Disclosure and Preservation of
Plaintiffs Facebook and Myspace Information, claiming that the
private portions of the plaintiffs social media pages may contain
other relevant information pertinent to the plaintiffs damage
claims.42 In response, the plaintiff argued that his privacy inter-
ests outweighed any need to obtain the private content.43
tation. Id. The court apparently disagreed and issued an order denying the defendant's
motion to strike the plaintiffs objections. Kennedy, No. 100201473, 2011 WL 7110212.
In Piccolo, the plaintiff was injured in an automobile accident, and the defendant
conceded negligence; the only issue to be decided was damages. Gina Passarella, Facebook
Postings Barred from Discovery in Accident Case, THE LEGAL INTELLIGENCER (May 17,
2011) (LEXIS, Legal Intelligencer). Defense counsel wanted the plaintiff to accept a friend
request in order to gain access to the plaintiffs Facebook postings and pictures. Id. The
plaintiff denied the request citing PA. R. CIV. P. 4011(b) and arguing that the materiality
and importance of the evidence sought was outweighed by the annoyance, embarrassment,
oppression and burden to which it exposed the plaintiff. Id. The plaintiff argued that de-
fense counsel only inquired about pictures the plaintiff posted on Facebook at the plaintiffs
deposition and not about any textual postings. Id. According to the plaintiff, the defendant
had already been provided with a complete photographic record of plaintiffs pre- and post-
accident condition as reasonably could be expected, and any additional photos gleaned from
her Facebook account were unnecessary. Id. Accordingly, the plaintiff argued that the
defendant did not make a prima facie showing of the need for access to the non-public pag-
es, nor did the plaintiff assert any likelihood that the request would lead to the discovery of
any material evidence. Id. Seemingly, the trial court judge agreed, and denied the motion
to compel-unfortunately, without a written opinion supporting the order. Id.
39. 2011 Pa. Dist. & Cnty. Dec. LEXIS 187 at *1. The plaintiff sought damages for
injuries to his leg, lost wages, lost earning capacity, pain and suffering, scarring and em-
barrassment. Id. The plaintiff claimed that his health was seriously and permanently
impaired and that he "sustained a permanent diminution in the ability to enjoy life and
life's pleasures." Id.
40. Id. at *1-2.
41. Id. at *2.
42. Id. at *2.
43. Id. The plaintiff also argued that the court should conduct its own in camera in-
spection of the private pages and decide itself what information is discoverable. Id. at n.2.
The court rejected this argument, stating that any in camera review would be too time
consuming and a waste of the court's resources. Id.
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The court adopted the rationale and opinion of McMillen and
granted the defendant's Motion to Compel.44 However, unlike
McMillen, the Zimmerman court addressed the plaintiffs conten-
tion that ordering him to produce his private social media content
would violate his privacy interests and outweigh any need the de-
fendant may have for the information."5 In response, the court
noted that the Fourth Amendment's right to privacy protects peo-
ple, not places, and that the reasonableness standard of the right
to privacy is applied in that manner.4 6 The court indicated that,
when the litigant chooses to disclose the information with others,
privacy concerns are not as a great as they would be otherwise.4 7
The court then pointed out that both Facebook's and Myspace's
policies do not guarantee complete privacy and that any content a
user posts on these sites could become viewable by the public.4 8
Like McMillen, the court determined that, because the content
on the public portions of his Facebook and Myspace pages con-
tained relevant information about his condition, "there is a rea-
sonable likelihood of additional relevant and material infor-
mation" being discovered on the private portions of his social me-
dia sites." Because the plaintiff placed his physical condition at
issue, voluntarily posted the pictures and information on the sites,
and knew that his information could become publicly available,
the court reasoned that he could not now claim he had a reasona-
ble expectation of privacy.o The court then stated, "any relevant,
44. Id. at *4. The court agreed with McMillen, stating that "no privilege exists in
Pennsylvania for information posted in the non-public sections of social media websites,
liberal discovery is generally allowable, and the pursuit of truth as to alleged claims is a
paramount ideal." Id. The court also adopted the holding and rationale of Romano v.
Steelcase, Inc., 907 N.Y.2d 650 (N.Y. Sup. Ct. Suffolk Cnty. 2010), and aptly compared
Romano to the plaintiffs case. Id. at *4-9.
45. Id. at *7-12. The court noted that McMillen did not address the right to privacy
issue, and only focused on whether a privilege for non-disclosure existed in Pennsylvania.
Id. at *7 n.5.
46. Id. at *7-8 (citing Romano, 907 N.Y.2d at 655). In Romano, the court stated that
[i]n determining whether a right to privacy exists via the Fourth Amendment, courts
apply the reasonableness standard set forth in the concurring opinion of Justice Har-
lan in Katz: "first that a person have [sic] exhibited an actual (subjective) expectation
of privacy and, second, that the expectation be one that society is prepared to recog-
nize as reasonable."
Romano, 907 N.Y.2d at 655-56 (citing Katz v. United States, 389 U.S. 347, 361 (1967) (Har-
lan, J., concurring)).
47. See Zimmerman, 2011 Pa. Dist. & Cnty. Dec. LEXIS at *8 (citing Romano, 907
N.Y.2d at 656).
48. Id.
49. Id. at *10.
50. Id. at *9-10 (adopting the approach taken by Romano, 907 N.Y.2d at 656-57). The
court reasoned that, "[bly definition, a social networking site is the interactive sharing of
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non-privileged information about one's life that is shared with
others and can be gleaned by defendants from the internet is fair
game in today's society."5' The court granted the defendant's Mo-
tion to Compel, and ordered the plaintiff to furnish the defendant
with the usernames and passwords for his Facebook and Myspace
accounts and to not delete or alter the information currently con-
tained on the accounts.52
Continuing the trend set forth in McMillen and Zimmerman, in
probably the most comprehensive and expansive opinion dealing
with the discoverability of private social media content in Penn-
sylvania, the next case in which a Pennsylvania Court of Common
Pleas judge issued an opinion granting the discovery of private
social media content was Largent v. Reed." In Largent, the plain-
tiffs, a driver and passenger of a motorcycle, allegedly sustained
injuries in a chain-reaction motor vehicle accident and brought
suit against the drivers of the other two vehicles involved in the
accident.54 At the deposition of one of the plaintiffs, defense coun-
sel discovered that the plaintiff had a Facebook account. 5 The
plaintiff refused to voluntarily disclose her log-in information
when defense counsel asked for it, which in turn prompted the
defendant to file a motion to compel." In the defendant's motion
to compel, the defendant indicated that she was able to view pho-
tographs that the plaintiff posted on a Harley Davidson Member
Forum and argued that she had a good faith belief that the private
portion of the plaintiffs Facebook account may also contain rele-
vant information necessary to the defendant's defense of the law-
your personal life with others; the recipients are not limited in what they do with such
knowledge." Id. at *10.
51. Id. at *10. In a footnote, the court noted that litigants would not have access to an
opponent's Facebook and Myspace information in every type of personal injury case where
damages are sought. Id. n.8. The court stated that relief would only be granted in situa-
tions where the party seeking discovery has made "some threshold showing that the public-
ly accessible portions of any social networking site contain information that would suggest
that further relevant postings are likely to be found by access to the non-public portions."
Id. (citing McCann v. Harleysville Ins. Co., 78 A.D.3d 1524 (N.Y. App. Div. 2010)). The
court noted that "fishing expeditions" would not be allowed. Id.
52. Id. at *12.
53. No. 2009-1823, 2011 WL 5632688 (Pa. Ct. Com. Pl. Franklin Nov. 7, 2011) (opinion
and order granting defendant's motion to compel).
54. Largent, No. 2009-1823, slip op. at 2 (Pa. Ct. Com. Pl. Franklin Nov. 7, 2011).
Plaintiffs alleged "serious and permanent physical and mental injuries, pain, and suffer-
ing." Id.
55. Id.
56. Id. at 2-3.
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suit.57  Specifically, the defendant claimed that the plaintiffs for-
mer public (now private) Facebook account included several pho-
tographs that showed the plaintiff enjoying life with her family
and a "status update" about going to the gym.58 In response, the
plaintiff argued the requests were overly broad and sought irrele-
vant information, did not meet the standards set forth in Rule
4003.1(a) of the Pennsylvania Rules of Civil Procedure, violated
the Stored Communications Act, and created unreasonable annoy-
ance and embarrassment."
The court began its analysis with a discussion about the pur-
pose of Facebook, how it is used, and its "ever-changing privacy
policy."o The court pointed out that Facebook makes users aware
that their information may be shared by default and that Face-
book may reveal any private content in response to certain legal
requests.1
Next, the court pointed out that "Pennsylvania['s] discovery
rules are broad, and the relevancy threshold is slight." 2 The court
found that the information sought by the defendant in this case
was clearly relevant and satisfied the relevancy requirement of
Rule 4003.1(a), as the information could undermine the plaintiffs
claims of damages.63
After determining that the information sought was relevant, the
court discussed the privilege and privacy concerns regarding dis-
covery of private social media content.64 The court indicated that,
"[ilf either Pennsylvania's law of privilege or statutory law, such
as the Stored Communications Act, prohibits disclosure, the rele-
57. Defendant Jessica Rosko's (incorrectly identified as Jessica Reed) Motion to Compel
Plaintiff Jennifer Largent's Facebook Log-In Info. 22, Largent, No. 2009-1823, 2011 WL
5632688 (No. 2009-1823), 2011 WL 6432493, at *1. Defense counsel argued that the dis-
covery of the private information would be relevant to the plaintiffs damage claims includ-
ing her claim that her life's activities have been limited. Id. 21.
58. Largent, No. 2009-1823, slip op. at 6, 8.
59. See id. at 6.
60. Id. at 3-5. The court gives an in-depth and thorough explanation of how Facebook's
privacy policy works, the different privacy settings available to users, and how the net-
working/sharing works on Facebook. Id. at 4-5.
61. Id. at 5.
62. Id. at 6 (citing George v. Schirra, 814 A.2d 202, 204 (Pa. Super. Ct. 2002)). The
court went on to cite several other trial court cases from Pennsylvania and other jurisdic-
tions that have allowed social media discovery, and then noted, "[als far as the threshold
relevancy inquiry in concerned, it is clear that material on social networking websites is
discoverable in a civil case." Id. 7-8.
63. Id. at 8.
64. Id. at 8-12.
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vant information [sought] is not discoverable."" Like McMillen,
the court noted that Pennsylvania law does not favor privileges,
and that Pennsylvania has no confidential social networking privi-
lege." Also like McMillen, the court noted that Facebook users
have no reasonable expectation of privacy because most of the in-
formation posted on Facebook is shared with other people and
may also be shared with strangers." The court explained that,
even if a Facebook user adjusted his or her privacy setting to "pri-
vate," it would not protect the information contained on his or her
site from being discovered." As such, the court refused to create a
privilege for private social media content."
Unlike the Pennsylvania trial courts discussed above, the
Largent court was the first to discuss the Stored Communications
Act (SCA)" and whether it prohibits disclosure of private social
media content.' The court noted that the SCA limits the govern-
ment's ability to compel Internet Service Providers (ISPs) from
disclosing its users' information, and limits the ISPs' ability to
disclose its customers' and subscribers' information.72 According
to the court, Crispin v. Christian Audigier, Inc. was the only other
court to address whether Facebook is an entity covered by the
SCA." The court then discussed Crispin, a case in which the trial
judge granted a motion to quash a defendant's subpoenas upon the
plaintiffs social networking sites and held that civil subpoenas
seeking to gain private communications posted on a user's Face-
book and other social networking sites are never permissible un-
der the SCA.7 4 The court distinguished Crispin from the current
case because Crispin dealt with private information sought direct-
ly from the social media company via a subpoena whereas the de-
fendant in this case sought information directly from the plain-
65. Id. at 9.
66. Id.
67. Id. The court indicated that, like undelivered email messages, undelivered Face-
book messages may have a reasonable expectation of privacy attached to them. Id. n.10.
However, the court noted that "the expectation of privacy vanishes once the email reaches
the intended recipient. Id. (citing Commonwealth v. Proetto, 771 A.2d 823, 828 (Pa. Super.
Ct. 2001)).
68. Id. (citing EEOC v. Simply Storage Mgmt., 270 F.R.D. 430, 434 (S.D. Ind. 2010)).
69. Id.
70. 18 U.S.C. §§2701-2712 (2012).
71. Largent, No. 2009-1823, slip op. at 10-12.
72. Id. at 10 (citing 18 U.S.C. §§ 2702-03).
73. Id. at 11; see Crispin v. Christian Audigier, Inc., 717 F. Supp. 2d 965 (C.D. Cal.
2010).
74. Id. (citing Crispin, 717 F. Supp. 2d at 975-76) (citations omitted).
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tiff.7 5 The court noted that the SCA does not apply in this situa-
tion because the plaintiff was not an entity regulated by the SCA
and therefore, cannot claim the protections of the SCA."
Finally, the judge discussed the breadth of the discovery re-
quests and determined that the requests were not in violation of
Rule 4011 of the Pennsylvania Rules of Civil Procedure.7 ' The
court noted that the "mere existence of some annoyance or embar-
rassment is insufficient to bar discovery" and that
"[u]nreasonableness is determined on a case-by-case basis.""
Here, the plaintiff argued that the defendant's motion to compel
was comparable to "asking [the plaintiffJ to turn over all of her
private photo albums and requesting to view her personal mail.""
In response, the court found the analogy misplaced, stating that
Facebook posts are not private or comparable to personal mail."o
In addition, the court explained that the plaintiff did not give any
reason why the discovery would cause any unreasonable embar-
rassment." Lastly, the court noted that granting defense counsel
access to the Facebook account did not cause an unreasonable an-
noyance because the plaintiff would still have access to her ac-
count and the defendant would cover the cost of investigating the
account.82
For the above reasons, the court granted the defendant's motion
to compel and ordered the plaintiff to turn over her Facebook log-
in information so that defense counsel could access the private
content. 8 3 In a footnote, the court recognized that discovery of pri-
vate social media content is not discoverable in every case; the
requesting party must first have a "good faith basis that discovery
request will lead to relevant information."8 4 According to the
75. Id.
76. Id.
77. Id. at 12-13. As stated supra note 11, PA. R. CIV .P. 4011 prohibits discovery if the
request is made in bad faith, or if the discovery would cause unreasonable annoyance, em-
barrassment, oppression, burden or expense to the deponent or any person or party.
78. Id. at 12 (citing CHRISTINE M. GIMENO ET AL., 9A GOODRICH AMRAM 2d § 4011(b):1
(2d ed.)).
79. Id. (citing Plaintiffs Answer to Defendants Motion to Compel 1[ 23).
80. Id. at 12-13.
81. Id. at 13.
82. Id.
83. Id. The court indicated that the defendant's counsel would only have twenty-one
days to inspect the Facebook page, at which time the Plaintiff could change her password,
thus preventing further access to her account. Id. at 13-14.
84. Id. at 13 n.13.
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court, the defendants had a good faith basis because the plaintiffs
profile was previously public."
On the other side of the discovery fence, Arcq v. Fields was the
first case in which a Pennsylvania Court of Common Pleas judge
issued an opinion that accompanied an order denying a motion to
compel discovery of private social media content.86 In Arcq, the
plaintiff was involved in an automobile accident and brought a
negligence action against the driver of the other vehicle and an
action against the driver's employer, claiming that it was vicari-
ously liable." The court noted that the plaintiff testified in his
deposition that he was incapable of performing certain physical
85. Id. The court cautioned, "[in other cases, it might be advisable to submit interrog-
atories and requests for production of documents to find out if any relevant information
exists on a person's online social networking profiles." Id.
86. No. 2008-2430 (Pa. Ct. Com. Pl. Franklin Dec. 7, 2011) (opinion and order denying
defendant's motion to compel). Prior to the opinion issued in Arcq, another Pennsylvania
trial court, in addition to the two discussed supra note 38, denied a defendant's motion to
compel discovery of private social media content without an opinion. See Kalinowski v.
Kirschenheiter, No. 2010-06779 (Pa. Ct. Com. Pl. Luzerne Aug. 8, 2011) (order denying
defendant's motion to compel but ordering plaintiff to preserve present Facebook or
Myspace pages), available at Cummins, supra note 1.
In Kalinowski, another personal injury case stemming from an automobile accident,
the defendant sought the Facebook and Myspace log-in information for the plaintiffs per-
sonal account, and for the accounts of bars owned by the plaintiff, as well as signed author-
izations from the plaintiff allowing the social media companies to release the private con-
tent contained on these accounts. Defendant's Motion to Compel at 1, Kalinowski, No.
2010-06779. See also Present, Plaintiffs Score a Pair of Wins in Social Media Decisions,
supra note 5. The defendant argued that the public portions of the bar's Facebook account
and the plaintiffs personal Myspace account contained pictures and posts that were incon-
sistent with the extent of the plaintiffs injuries, and as such, it argued that its requests for
the private information were reasonably calculated to lead to the discovery of admissible
evidence. Defendant's Motion to Compel 30-34, Kalinowski, No. 2010-06779. In re-
sponse, the plaintiff was able to successfully argue that there was no direct impeachment
evidence contained on any of the publicly viewable pages, which, he argued, was the re-
quirement "under the ripening body of case law in this state." See Present, Plaintiffs Score
a Pair of Wins in Social Media Decisions, supra note 5. The plaintiff argued that any fol-
low-up questions that the defendant thought necessary based on what the defendant saw
on the publicly viewable pages could have been handled by additional interrogatories.
Plaintiffs Brief in Opposition to Defendant's Motion to Compel at 4-6, Kalinowski, No.
2010-06779. The plaintiff further argued that the purpose of the defendant's motion to
compel was to embarrass the plaintiff or harm his character, and that the requests were
not reasonably calculated to lead to the discovery of admissible evidence. Id. at 5. Alt-
hough the trial court seemingly agreed with the plaintiff by denying the motion to compel,
another trial court in Pennsylvania could have easily considered the public posts relevant,
and ordered the plaintiff to provide the defendant with access to his private Facebook and
Myspace pages since the requests could have been considered reasonably calculated to lead
to other relevant information. The order signed by the court, the defendant's motion to
compel, and the plaintiffs brief in opposition to the defendant's motion to compel can be
accessed at Cummins, supra note 1.
87. Arcq, No. 2008-2430, slip op. at 1.
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activities due to the accident." Because the plaintiff put his phys-
ical, emotional and social conditions at issue, the defendant sought
to obtain the usernames and passwords for all of the plaintiffs
social networking sites and copies of any and all information con-
tained on the sites that may be relevant to the case." In response,
the plaintiff argued that the defendant's requests were not rea-
sonably calculated to lead to the discovery of admissible evidence
and that the plaintiff had a reasonable expectation of privacy in
regards to this information.o
In responding to the defendant's motion, the court distinguished
these facts from those in McMillen, Zimmerman, and Romano."
The court noted that those cases involved plaintiffs who posted
information on their social media accounts that were publicly
viewable, and that the information contradicted the plaintiffs'
claims of damages.9 2 Therefore, the parties seeking non-public
information in those cases had reason to believe that the private
portions of the accounts would also contain relevant information."
Here, however, the court did not follow McMillen, Zimmerman,
and Romano because the defendant's request did not arise from
viewing relevant information on the plaintiffs publicly viewable
pages.94 In the cases permitting discovery, the trial courts granted
the motions to compel because "the party seeking information had
a basis for their request" and the requests "were reasonably calcu-
lated to yield information that would lead to admissible evi-
dence."" In the case at hand, however, the defendant did not es-
tablish any basis for believing that the plaintiffs private social
media content would contain any relevant information nor that
the plaintiffs content was ever publicly viewable." Therefore, the
court denied the defendant's motion to compel, holding that "the
defendant [must] have some good faith belief that the private pro-
file may contain information."" It explained that trial courts




91. Id. at 2.
92. Id. at 2.
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media account will contain relevant information." "In essence,"
the court added, "viewing relevant information on the public pro-
file acts as a gateway to the private profile.""
As the above cases indicate,'o the general rule emerging in the
trial courts' decisions is that in order for private social media con-
tent to be discoverable, the party requesting it must first show
that the public portion of the site includes relevant information or
have another good faith reason for requesting it. If the requesting
party meets this threshold requirement, it will be able to obtain
unfettered access to the litigant's social media account. However,
these non-precedential decisions do not prevent other trial judges
from granting access to private information without a threshold
showing of relevance on the publicly viewable pages. In fact, one
98. Id. at 4.
99. Id. (distinguishing Arcq from Largent).
100. Two other (known) cases in which a Pennsylvania trial court judge issued an order
regarding discovery of private social media were Martin v. Allstate Fire & Casualty Ins.
Co., No. 110402438 (Pa. Ct. Com. Pl. Phila. Dec. 13, 2011) (order denying defendant's mo-
tion to compel) and Gallagher v. Urbanovich, No. 2010-33418 (Pa. Ct. Com. Pl. Montgomery
Feb. 27, 2012) (order granting plaintiffs motion to compel). Again, the judges in these
cases did not provide opinions with their orders.
In Martin, another personal injury case, the trial court judge refused to grant an
insurance company's request to access the plaintiffs Facebook information after the plain-
tiff successfully argued that the defendant was unable to point to any specific posts, rele-
vant or not, on the public portion of the plaintiffs Facebook account. Present, Plaintiffs
Win Round on Discovery of Facebook Pages, supra note 5. The plaintiff argued that the
defendant did not ask the plaintiff what she used Facebook for or whether she posted any
updates or photographs about her injury. Id. Therefore, the plaintiff argued that the pri-
vate portion of her Facebook account was undiscoverable because the defendant offered no
evidence that it contained anything relevant to her claims. Id. Apparently, the court
agreed with the plaintiff and denied the motion to compel. Martin, No. 110402438 (order
denying defendant's motion to compel).
In Gallagher, the tide was turned when a Pennsylvania Common Pleas Court judge
ordered a defendant, and not a plaintiff, to provide Facebook log-in information and not to
delete or erase any of the information contained on his page. Gallagher, No. 2010-33418
(order granting plaintiffs motion to compel). The plaintiff sued the defendant for allegedly
striking the plaintiff in the face and breaking his nose during an intramural soccer game.
Plaintiffs Motion to Compel 1 1, Gallagher, No. 2010-06779. In Plaintiffs discovery re-
quests, which were attached as Exhibit B to the plaintiffs motion to compel, the plaintiff
asked the defendant to identify and provide the social media accounts he belonged to, and
to identify and provide all the information contained or posted on the accounts for the past
three years. Id. 112. This author is unaware of the oral arguments made to the judge at
motion's court, but the plaintiffs motion to compel did not provide any indication that the
defendant's public portion of Facebook contained relevant information. See id. The de-
fendant objected to the requests on the grounds that they were "overly broad and/or seek
irrelevant information and are not reasonably calculated to lead to the discovery of relevant
evidence that would be admissible at trial." Defendant's Response to Plaintiffs Motion to
Compel 1 16, Gallagher, No. 2010-06779. Nevertheless, the court granted the plaintiffs
motion to compel and ordered the plaintiff to provide his Facebook username, email and
password, and to not delete the information contained therein. Gallagher, No. 2010-33418
(order granting plaintiffs motion to compel).
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could argue that most private social media accounts likely would
contain some relevant information regarding a litigant's life and
well-being, events the litigant participates in, or information per-
taining to how he or she spends his or her time.
Pennsylvania trial courts are not bound by the emerging
"threshold rule" and could easily determine that discovery re-
quests seeking information on the private accounts are reasonably
calculated to lead to admissible evidence relevant to a plaintiffs
damage claims. Would this granting of unfettered access to pri-
vate social media content be going too far? The issue that needs to
be (and should be) decided by a Pennsylvania appellate court is
whether private content contained on social media sites is discov-
erable without a threshold showing of relevance on the public por-
tion of a user's social media page. The appellate court should also
provide guidance on the proper scope of discovery of private social
media when a user's public account contains relevant information,
and determine if ordering a litigant to produce his or her
usernames and passwords or to sign an authorization releasing all
of his or her private social media content is proper under the
Pennsylvania Rules of Civil Procedure.
III. THE PROPER METHOD AND SCOPE OF PRIVATE SOCIAL MEDIA
DISCOVERY
Discovery of private social media content is and should be dis-
coverable in Pennsylvania. After all, a great deal of relevant in-
formation might appear on a user's social media page. However,
the private content should be discoverable only to a certain extent
and under certain circumstances. Access to such information
should not be freely granted in every case and, at the very least, a
litigant's discovery requests should be narrowly tailored to seek
only relevant information. Courts should not allow methods of
obtaining private social media content that are unlimited in scope
and time. The Pennsylvania trial courts that have granted com-
plete access to a litigant's private social media account-by order-
ing a user to furnish his or her usernames and passwords or to
sign authorizations that release all of a user's private social media
content-have circumvented the Pennsylvania Rules of Civil Pro-
cedure and have not adhered to the typical way discovery is con-
ducted. By granting unrestricted access to all of a user's social
media content, trial judges are permitting litigants access to an
abundance of irrelevant and potentially embarrassing infor-
mation. Moreover, social media users may have at least some rea-
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sonable expectation of privacy when posting non-public infor-
mation to their accounts or messaging other users. Courts should
consider several factors before enabling litigants to access relevant
private social media content.
First, to begin the analysis of how discovery of private social
media should be conducted, one must first understand how Face-
book and Twitter work before delving into the Pennsylvania Rules
of Civil Procedure pertaining to discovery and the judicial opinions
construing these rules. Then, a brief discussion on the methods
litigants have used in an attempt to obtain an opponent's private
social media content will be proper. Finally, the two necessary
factors that Pennsylvania trial courts should consider when de-
termining the proper scope of private social media discovery re-
quests will be proposed.
A. Functions of Facebook and Twitter
For purposes of this Comment, a brief explanation of how Face-
book and Twitter work is necessary. 101 The following explanation
is by no means a representation of all the features available on
Facebook and Twitter. Rather, this explanation is a "crash
course" for readers with limited to no Facebook or Twitter
knowledge. For simplicity's sake, the name Patty will represent
the Facebook and Twitter user in the following two sub-sections.
1. Facebook
According to the social networking website,
Facebook's mission is to give people the power to share and
make the world more open and connected . . . . Millions of
people use Facebook everyday to keep up with friends, upload
an unlimited number of photos, share links and videos, and
learn more about the people they meet.102
A user can share information on Facebook in many ways. For ex-
ample, Patty can share information with other Facebook users
101. There are a number of other popular social media websites, including, Myspace,
LinkedIln, Flickr, Friendster, FourSquare, YouTube and Okrut. In an effort to keep this
Comment concise, only Facebook and Twitter will be explained in detail, as the number of
people that use each site is immense. For the number of users on each site, see Facebook,
supra, note 7.
102. FACEBOOK, About, http://www.facebook.com/facebook/info (last visited July 7, 2012).
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(usually "friends") in the form of a "status update."103 In a status
update, Patty can post short blocks of text indicating what she is
doing, how she is feeling, or what she is thinking. 10 In addition,
as a Facebook user, Patty creates a "profile" that includes certain
information about herself.10 ' Depending on other users' privacy
settings, Patty can post content on another user's wall (called
"wall posts"), send messages directly to another user, or have a
conversation with another user through Facebook's instant mes-
sage feature."0o When Patty "posts" a text or picture on another
user's wall, the information will be viewable by whomever the oth-
er user designates, depending on the other user's privacy set-
tings.o' Patty can also post and share pictures or videos on her
own wall, which, again, can be viewed by whomever Patty desig-
nates.0 s Patty can also "tag" other users in a status update or
photo.10 Tagging links the photo or status update to the tagged
user's profile. 110 When another user tags her, Patty has the option
to remove the tag so that the post no longer creates a link to Pat-
103. See Andrew C. Payne, Twitigation: Old Rules in a New World, 49 WASHBURN L. J.
841, 846 (2010). On Facebook, Patty can add "friends," which are other Facebook members
with whom Patty can share information. See FACEBOOK, Glossary,
http://www.facebook.com/help/glossary (last visited July 7, 2012). Patty is also able to
control who can see the information she posts every time she posts with the "audience se-
lector" feature. Id.
104. See Payne, supra note 103, at n.47 (citing Susan Whelan, An Introduction to Face-
book for Beginners: An Overview of the Facebook Network, SUITE101.COM (Jan. 15, 2008),
http://social-networking-tagging.suitel0l.com/article.cfm/facebook for beginners)).
105. See id. at n.49 (citing James Grimmelmann, Saving Facebook, 94 IOWA L. REV.
1137, 1149 (2009) ("identifying the possible information on a user's profile as 'name; birth-
day; political and religious views; online and offline contact information; gender, sexual
preference, and relationship status; favorite books, movies, and so on; educational and
employment history; and, of course, picture.'")). Certain profile information is viewable to
the whole public no matter what: "[alnyone can see your public information, which in-
cludes your name, profile picture, gender, username, user ID (account number), and net-
works." FACEBOOK, Basic Privacy Controls,
http://www.facebook.com/help/?page=132569486817869 (last visited July 7, 2012).
106. Payne, supra note 103, at 846. The direct message feature is similar to an email
and messages can be sent to one member, or a number of members in a "thread." See
FACEBOOK, Help, http://www.facebook.com/help/messages/basics (last visited July 7, 2012).
107. Payne, supra note 103, at n.50 (citations omitted). The information may be viewa-
ble to the entire Facebook community, friends, or friends of a friend. Id.
108. Id. at 846-47.
109. FACEBOOK, Tagging, http//www.facebook.com/help/tagging (last visited July 7,
2012). The picture or post on which Patty tags another member also shows up on the other
member's wall. Id. "For example, you can tag a photo to show who's in the photo or post a
status update and say who you're with. If you tag a friend in your status update, anyone
who sees that update can click on your friend's name and go to their [profile]. Your status
update will also show up on that friend's [wall]." Id. When another member adds a tag of
Patty, friends of Patty may be able to see the tagged post. Id.
110. Id.
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ty's profile or shows up on her wall."' Patty can also "comment"
on another user's posts if the user allows her to do so, and those to
whom Patty grants permission can "comment" on her posts. De-
pending on Patty's adjustable settings, Patty's "timeline""2 may
contain all of her "photos, stories, and experiences" including, but
not limited to, her past status updates, posts, and any other con-
tent that other users have posted to Patty's wall or tagged Patty
in.'13 Finally, Patty has the option to designate exactly who can
view the information contained on her timeline or in her photo
album with Facebook's privacy settings.114
2. Twitter
"Twitter is a real-time information network that connects you to
the latest stories, ideas, opinions and news about what you find
interesting.""' According to Payne, "Twitter is a much simpler
social-networking device" than Facebook."e In short, Twitter al-
lows Patty to share short messages known as "tweets" with other
users."' Patty also may share photos in her tweets. If Patty
chooses to make her tweets available to the public, anybody can
view them."' However, if Patty chooses to make her tweets pri-
vate, only those users whom Patty allows to "follow" her will be
able to view her tweets."s Likewise, Patty can choose the users
she wants to follow.'20 Tweets from the users Patty follows will
show up on her Twitter homepage for her to read.12' In addition,
111. Id.
112. On Facebook's site, Facebook uses the words "wall," "profile," and "timeline" inter-
changeably. See generally FACEBOOK, Learn About Facebook,
http://www.facebook.com/help/basics/learn-about-facebook (last visited July 7, 2012).
113. See FACEBOOK Glossary, supra, note 103.
114. FACEBOOK, Help Center, Learn About Your Privacy Options,
http://www.facebook.com/help/timeline/privacy (last visited July 7, 2012). The member can
choose to share a status update or post that shows up on their Timeline with the entire
Facebook community, "friends," nobody, or a custom group of people with whom the user
chooses. FACEBOOK, Help Center, When I share something, how do I choose who can see it?,
http://www.facebook.com/help/?faq=120939471321735 (last visited July 7, 2012).
115. TWITTER, About, https://twitter.com/about (last visited July 10, 2012).
116. See Payne, supra note 103, at 847.
117. TWITTER, Help Center, https//support.twitter.com/groups/31-twitter-
basics/topics/104-welcome-to-twitter-support/articles/215585-twitter-101-how-should-i-get-
started-using-twitter (last visited July 7, 2012). Each tweet contains 140 characters or less.
Payne, supra note 103, at 847.
118. TWITTER, Help Center, https//support.twitter.com/articles/14016-about-public-and-
protected-tweets (last visited July 7, 2012).
119. Id.




public tweets can be "re-tweeted" by any Twitter user, which dis-
seminates the tweet to whoever "follows" the re-tweeter. 122
Obviously, Facebook and Twitter offer many different ways of
sharing and communicating with other members, as well as many
types of privacy settings that allow a user to designate who can
see what information. When determining the proper method and
scope of discovering private social media content, and before
granting unfettered access to all of the content contained on a liti-
gant's social media page, courts must consider the different at-
tributes of social media and understand how information is shared
(and not shared).123
B. The Pennsylvania Discovery Rules
Pennsylvania Rules of Civil Procedure 4001 through 4025 gov-
ern the rules of discovery. Pennsylvania Rule of Civil Procedure
4003.1 provides for the "Scope of Discovery Generally." 12 4 In per-
tinent part, Rule 4003.1(a) states that "a party may obtain discov-
ery regarding any matter, not privileged, which is relevant to the
subject matter involved in the pending action, whether it relates
to the claim or defense of the party seeking discovery or to the
claim or defense of any other party."'25 Rule 4003.1(b) liberalizes
discovery: "It is not ground for objection that the information
sought will be inadmissible at the trial if the information sought
appears reasonably calculated to lead to the discovery of admissi-
ble evidence."126 Rules 4011 and 4012 place limitations on discov-
ery. Rule 4011 states
No discovery, including discovery of electronically stored in-
formation, shall be permitted which (a) is sought in bad faith;
(b) would cause unreasonable annoyance, embarrassment,
oppression, burden or expense to the deponent or any person
or party; (c) is beyond the scope of discovery as set forth in
122. TwIrrER, Help Center, How to Retweet a Tweet,
https://support.twitter.com/groups/31-twitter-basics/topics/109-tweets-
messages/articles/20169873-how-to-retweet-a-tweet (last visited July 7, 2012).
123. See Payne, supra note 103, at 846 ("To understand fully the details, it is important
to understand how users create information, how users are able to place privacy re-
strictions on the information they create through internal controls, how information is
stored, and how popular the use of these sites is becoming.").
124. PA. R. CIV. P. 4003.1. This rule is "taken almost verbatim from FED. R. CIv. P.
26(b)." Id. (1978 Explanatory Comment).
125. PA. R. CIV.P. 4003.1(a).
126. PA. R. CIV. P. 4003.1(b).
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Rules 4003.1 through 4003.6; (d) is prohibited by any law bar-
ring disclosure of mediation communications and mediation
documents; or (e) would require the making of an unreasona-
ble investigation by the deponent or any party or witness.127
Rule 4012 allows a trial court to enter a protective order.128 Spe-
cifically, Rule 4012 states that "[ulpon motion by a party .. . from
whom discovery . .. is sought, and for good cause shown, the court
may make any order which justice requires to protect a party ...
from unreasonable annoyance, embarrassment, oppression, bur-
den or expense."129 Despite the limits set forth in Rule 4011 and
4012, the discovery rules generally allow for liberal discovery.'
Nonetheless, when considering whether to allow a litigant to ob-
tain private social media content, courts need to strike a balance
between the liberalness of the discovery rules and the abundance
of irrelevant and/or potentially embarrassing content that the liti-
gant would receive if unfettered access to a user's social media
account were granted.
C. The Discovery Methods that Litigant's Have Used in an Effort
to Obtain Private Social Media Content
In general, litigants have used four methods in an effort to ob-
tain an opponent's private social media content: (1) subpoenaing
the content directly from the social media company;'13 (2) request-
ing the opponent sign an authorization to release the private so-
127. PA. R. Ctv. P. 4011 (amended in August 2012 to include the phrase "including dis-
covery of electronically stored information").
128. PA. R. Civ. P. 4012. This rule is similar to FED. R. CrV. P. 26(c).
129. Id. The court's protective order may state:
(1) that the discovery . . . shall be prohibited; (2) that the discovery ... shall be only
on specified terms and conditions, including a designation of the time and place; (3)
that the discovery .. . shall be only by a method of discovery . .. other than that se-
lected by the party seeking discovery . . . ; (4) that certain matters shall not be in-
quired into; (5) that the scope of discovery ... shall be limited; (6) that discovery or
deposition shall be conducted with no one present except persons designated by the
court; ... (8) that the parties simultaneously shall file specified documents or infor-
mation enclosed in sealed envelopes to be opened as directed by the court.
Id. This follows FED. R. Civ. P. 26(c).
130. See, e.g., PECO Energy Co. v. Ins. Co. of N. Am., 852 A.2d 1230, 1233 (Pa. Super.
Ct. 2004); George v. Schirra, 814 A.2d 202, 204 (Pa. Super. Ct. 2002).
131. See, e.g., Crispin v. Audigier, Inc., 717 F. Supp. 2d 965, 968 (C.D. Cal. 2010);
Ledbetter v. Wal-Mart Stores, Inc., No. 06-cv-01958-WYD-MJW, 2009 U.S. Dist. LEXIS
126859, at *2 (D. Colo. Apr. 21, 2009); Mackelprang v. Fidelity Nat'l Title Agency of Nev.,
No. 2:06-cv-00788-JCM-GWF, 2007 WL 119149, at *2 (D. Nev. Jan. 9, 2007).
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cial media content;13 2 (3) requesting the opponent's usernames and
passwords; 133 and/or (4) requesting production of private social
media content directly from the opponent. 134  Because of the
Stored Communications Act,135 social media companies are unlike-
ly to respond to civil subpoenas that seek a user's private content
without a user's consent.13 1 Therefore, litigants can only obtain
access to an opponent's private social media content through
methods (2), (3), and (4).
This Comment argues that, in most situations, requesting rele-
vant private content directly from the opponent via requests for
production of documents is the proper way of conducting social
media discovery under the Pennsylvania Rules of Civil Procedure
and is in line with how discovery is typically conducted. Nonethe-
less, option (2), requesting a signed authorization for the release of
information, should also be available for litigants, but only under
limited circumstances and only when the authorization is limited
132. See, e.g., Tompkins v. Detroit Metro. Airport, 278 F.R.D. 387, 387 (E.D. Mich. 2012);
Mackelprang, 2007 WL 119149, at *2; McCann v. Harleysville Ins. Co., 910 N.Y.S.2d 614,
614 (N.Y. App. Div. 2010); Romano v. Steelcase, Inc., 907 N.Y.S.2d 650, 657 (N.Y. Sup. Ct.
2010); Coy-Burt v. Hoskins, No. 090901827 (Pa. Ct. Com. Pl. Phila.Apr. 28, 2010);
Kalinowski v. Kirschenheiter, No. 2010-06779 (Pa. Ct. Com. Pl. Luzerne Aug. 8, 2011).
133. See, e.g., Gallagher v. Urbanovich, No. 2010-33418 (Pa. Ct. Com. Pl. Montgomery
Feb. 27, 2012); Arcq v. Fields, No. 2008-2430 (Pa. Ct. Com. Pl. Franklin Dec. 7, 2011);
Largent v. Reed, No. 2009-1823, slip op. at 5, (Pa. Ct. Com. Pl. Franklin Nov. 7, 2011).;
Kalinowski, No. 2010-06779; Zimmerman v. Weis Mkts., Inc., No. CV-09-1535, 2011 Pa.
Dist. & Cnty. Dec. LEXIS 187 (Pa. Ct. Com. Pl. Northumberland May 19, 2011); Kennedy v.
Norfolk S. Corp., No. 100201473, 2011 WL 7110212 (Pa. Ct. Com. Pl. Phila. Jan. 4, 2011);
McMillen v. Hummingbird Speedway, Inc., No. 113-2010 CD, 2010 Pa. Dist. & Cnty. Dec.
LEXIS 270, at *1 (Pa. Ct. Com. Pl. Jefferson Sept. 9, 2010).
134. See, e.g., Held v. Ferrellgas, Inc., No. 10-2393-EFM, 2011 WL 3896513, at *1 (D.
Kan. Aug. 31, 2011); EEOC v. Simply Storage Mgmt., 270 F.R.D. 430, 432 (S.D. Ind. 2010);
Bass v. Miss Porter's Sch., Civil No. 3:08cv1807, 2009 WL 3724968, at *1 (D. Conn. Oct. 27
2009); McCann, 910 N.Y.S.2d at 614; Arcq, No. 2008-2430. Additionally, in some instances,
litigants have requested that the opposing party accept a friend request so that they could
view the information. See Passarella, supra, note 38, discussing Piccolo v. Paterson, No.
2009-04979, 2011 Pa. Dist. & Cnty. Dec. LEXIS 45 (Ct. Com. Pl. Bucks May 5, 2011).
135. 18 U.S.C. §§2701-2712 (2011). For a comprehensive discussion of the Stored Com-
munications Act and how it applies to social media discovery, see Ryan A. Ward, Comment,
Discovering Facebook: Social Network Subpoenas and the Stored Communications Act, 24
HARV. J.L. & TECH. 563 (2011).
136. Kristen L. Mix, Discovery of Social Media, 5 FED. CTS. L. REV. 119, 122 (2010)
(quoting Evan E. North, Comment, Facebook Isn't Your Space Anymore: Discovery of Social
Networking Websites, 58 U. KAN. L. REV. 1279, 1306 (2010)); see also Bower v. Bower, 808
F. Supp. 2d 348, 349 (D. Mass. 2011) (indicating that the SCA prevents Yahoo! and Google
from responding to a civil subpoena requesting production of emails without the user's
consent); Crispin v. Christian Audigier, Inc., 717 F. Supp. 2d 965, 991 (C.D. Cal. 2010)
(quashing subpoenas to Myspace and Facebook on the grounds that the private information
sought was protected by the SCA); Mackelprang, 2007 WL 119149, at *2 (indicating that
Myspace refused to produce private email messages on plaintiffs account in the absence of
a search warrant or plaintiffs consent to the production).
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in time and scope. Option (3), requesting a party's usernames and
passwords, should never be granted because such a request is
overly broad and unlimited in time and scope. In reviewing rele-
vant case law, there are no other cases in which any other juris-
diction has ordered a litigant to furnish his or her usernames and
passwords to an opponent like the aforementioned Pennsylvania
trial courts.
D. - Factors to Consider when Determining the Proper Scope of
Private Social Media Discovery
Requests for an opponent to sign an authorization consenting to
release all his or her private social media content or to furnish his
or her login information usually will be met by strong objections.
Specifically, the user will likely argue that the requests are overly
broad and seek irrelevant information, are not reasonably calcu-
lated to lead to admissible evidence, invade the user's privacy, and
seek embarrassing information. This refusal will then lead the
requesting party to file a motion to compel.137 In deciding whether
to grant a motion to compel, trial courts should consider the fol-
lowing two factors, in addition to those already mentioned above:
(1) the user's expectation of privacy, including whether the user
will be unreasonably forced to divulge embarrassing and/or pri-
vate information; and (2) the reasonableness and breadth of the
particular discovery request and the likelihood that it will lead to
relevant information. These two factors overlap a great deal, and
one factor can be dispositive of the issue without considering the
other. After looking at these two factors, courts should conclude
that granting unrestricted access to a litigant's social media page
is not proper. Ultimately, the scope of discovery of social media
content "requires the application of basic discovery principles in a
novel context."'s For courts, "the challenge is to define appropri-
ately broad limits-but limits nevertheless--on the discoverability
of social communications."a'
137. In the alternative, before a motion to compel is filed, the responding party may seek
a protective order under Pennsylvania's Rule of Civil Procedure 4012 asking the court to
limit the request with a protective order. PA. R. CIV. P. 4012.
138. EEOC, 270 F.R.D. at 434.
139. Id. (emphasis added).
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1. The User's Expectation of Privacy, Including Whether the
User Will Be Unreasonably Forced to Divulge
Embarrassing and/or Private Information
Privacy is probably the most argued issue regarding discovery of
private social media.140 Most courts that have discussed the dis-
coverability of private social media have determined that a user
does not have a reasonable expectation of privacy in the content
contained on his or her social media site because others can view
and disseminate the content.141 These courts have discounted the
fact that privacy settings allow social media users to control who,
if anyone, can see content they post. It is these privacy controls
that may actually (or do) create a reasonable expectation of priva-
cy in the user, especially in today's society where users are willing
to post so many "intimate details of their lives on the Internet."142
Many conversations a user has through Facebook's direct messag-
ing or instant messaging system, as well as photographs posted on
the social media site, may be extremely embarrassing and not
viewable by the entire public. A user may feel comfortable having
intimate conversations and/or posting embarrassing photographs
because he or she does not expect a stranger to view this private
information due to the privacy settings. Nonetheless, most courts
have been unwilling to recognize a privacy interest in the infor-
mation people post on the Internet. In light of the arguments to
follow, these courts should reconsider their stance.
Under section 4011(b) of the Pennsylvania Rules of Civil Proce-
dure, discovery requests that cause unreasonable embarrassment
are not permitted. 14 3 Pennsylvania courts "have been given wide
discretion to preclude or appropriately limit the use of any partic-
ular disclosure device where it determines that the use of that de-
vice would cause unreasonable annoyance, embarrassment, open-
ness, burden or expense."'44 The objecting party bears the burden
of showing that a request would cause unreasonable embarrass-
ment.145  The mere existence of some embarrassment is not
140. Mix, supra note 136, at 127.
141. See id. (quoting Sharon Nelson et al., The Legal Implications of Social Networking,
22 REGENT U. L. REV. 1, 21 (2009-10)).
142. Kelly Ann Bub, Privacy's Role in the Discovery of Social Networking Site Infor-
mation, 64 SMU L. REV. 1433, 1434 (2011).
143. PA. R. CIv. P. 4011(b).
144. Shank v. Newman, 69 Pa. D. & C. 4th 48, 53 (Pa. Ct. Com. Pl. Lancaster 2004).
145. Golato v. Gillespie, 70 Pa. D. & C.2d 15, 19 (Pa. Ct. Corn Pl. Phila. 1973) (citations
omitted).
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enough to sustain an objection.'4 6 The key to disallowing a request
is to show its unreasonableness,14 7 and "the objecting party must
specifically show the effect of the proposed discovery request be-
fore the court may make a finding of unreasonableness."'48 Gen-
erally, a discovery request will be found to be unreasonable "where
it is stated too broadly, is without proper specification, and, in ef-
fect, amounts to a 'fishing expedition.'"'49 As I will explain in
greater detail below, requests that ask a user to furnish his or her
social media usernames and passwords or to sign an authorization
that would release all of his or her social media content are overly
broad and amount to a fishing expedition.' Accordingly, if a liti-
gant is able to specifically point to content that would embarrass
him or her, the request should be impermissible under Rule 4011.
At the very least, a court should enter a protective order over con-
tent falling within the ambit of Rule 4012.
Largent v. Reed was the only Pennsylvania trial court case to
address an argument that requesting access to all of a plaintiffs
private social media content would cause the plaintiff unreasona-
ble embarrassment.'' The court correctly noted that the "mere
existence of some annoyance or embarrassment is insufficient to
bar discovery."152 It stated that the "[unreasonableness is deter-
mined on a case-by-case basis."' 3 However, the plaintiff pointed
to nothing specific on the web site that would have caused unrea-
sonable embarrassment, and the court noted that "bald assertions
of embarrassment" were not enough to sustain an objection.' 5 4
The court stated that Facebook posts are not truly private and
that there is little harm in disclosing that information in discov-
ery.' Despite the fact that the court was aware of Facebook's
many attributes,' it nevertheless required the plaintiff to turn
146. GIMENO ET AL., supra note 78.
147. Id.
148. Id. (citing Azen v. Lampenfield, 18 Pa. D. & C.3d 574, 580 (Pa. Ct. Com. Pl. Alle-
gheny 1981).
149. GIMENO ET AL., supra note 78, at § 4011(b):2 (citing In re Townsend's Estate, 241
A.2d 534 (Pa. 1968) (decided under similar provision of prior rule)); see also Kintzer v.
Petrone, 39 Pa. D. & C.3d 486, 490 (Pa. Ct. Com. Pl. Berks 1985).
150. See infra, Section III(D)(2).
151. No. 2009-1823, slip op. at 12 (Pa. Ct. Com. Pl. Franklin Nov. 7, 2011).
152. Id. (citing GIMENO ET AL., supra note78).
153. Id.
154. Id. at 13.
155. Id.
156. See id. at 3-5.
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over her usernames and passwords to defense counsel. The
court never considered that by granting unrestricted access to the
plaintiffs entire Facebook account, the defendant's counsel had
access to every single picture, post and direct message that the
plaintiff had ever uploaded, posted, or sent. It never considered
that much of the content contained on the plaintiffs account was
likely irrelevant and/or potentially embarrassing.1 s8 Further, the
court apparently did not consider whether this content might have
been shared only with the plaintiffs closest and/or intimate
friends. 15 9
A court must also anticipate a similar and related consideration
under this factor: whether the user has a right to privacy in his or
her private social media content. The Pennsylvania Supreme
Court has stated that Rule 4011(b) is "merely a codification of this
Court's analysis of the constitutional right to privacy and as such
provides no more protection than the constitutional right pro-
vides.""'o Pennsylvania's Supreme Court has recognized that the
right to privacy is a well-settled principle that "avoid[s] unjustified
intrusions into the private zone of our citizens' lives.""6' However,
the right is not unqualified and "must be balanced against
weighty competing private and state interests."162 Under the
Fourth Amendment, courts have recognized at least two distinct
types of privacy interests: "One is the individual interest in avoid-
ing disclosure of personal matters, and another is the interest in
independence in making certain kinds of important decisions."
The Pennsylvania Supreme Court has recognized the same two
157. Id. at 13.
158. As one scholar has indicated,
There's all sorts of irrelevant and embarrassing information that might be social
networking sites. An individual might have sent flirting messages to someone. Satiri-
cal political posts might be misinterpreted out of context. Drunken party pictures or
photos of one's children might have no relevance to the case. Granting the opposing
party access to the account means that they will see everything you've ever done with
the account, no matter how irrelevant to the facts of the case.
Bruce E. Boyden, Can You Be Forced to Turn Over Your Social Network Passwords in a
Civil Case?, MARQUETTE UNIV. L. SCH. FAC. BLOG (Sept. 28 2010),
http://law.marquette.edu/facultyblog/2010/09/28/can-you-be-forced-to-turn-over-your-social-
network-passwords-in-a-civil-casel.
159. To the court's credit, it did state that the plaintiff never pointed to any embarrass-
ing content contained on her Facebook page. Largent, slip op. at 13. I am curious as to how
the court would have ruled if the plaintiff did point to intimate conversations or embarrass-
ing photos and status updates entirely irrelevant to the plaintiffs claims.
160. Stenger v. Lehigh Valley Hosp. Ctr., 609 A.2d 796, 803 (Pa. 1992).
161. Id. at 800.
162. Id. (citing Fabio v. Civil Serv. Comm'n of City of Phila., 414 A.2d 82 (Pa. 1980)).
163. Id. (citing Whalen v. Roe, 429 U.S. 589 (1977)) (footnote omitted).
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interests under the Pennsylvania Constitution." The privacy
interest at stake here, should a court determine that one exists,
revolves around an individual's interest in avoiding disclosure of
personal matters. "This interest finds explicit protection in Article
I, [Section 1, of the Pennsylvania Constitution, which provides
that '[a]ll men . . . have certain inherent and indefeasible rights,
among which are those ... of acquiring, possessing and protecting
property and reputation . . . ."' Before determining whether in-
trusions into a social media user's privacy interests are justified,"'
the court must first determine whether a social media user actual-
ly has a privacy interest in his or her private communications and
other content contained on a social media site.
As set forth in Commonwealth v. Proetto," a person must have
a legitimate expectation of privacy to invoke the protections of the
Pennsylvania Constitution."' The Pennsylvania Supreme Court
has indicated that when a person exhibits an actual expectation of
privacy that society would recognize as reasonable, the person has
a legitimate expectation of privacy.6 9 Under the United States
Constitution, the Fourth Amendment's right to privacy "does not
depend on a property right in the invaded place but does depend
on whether the person who claims the protection of the Amend-
ment has a legitimate expectation of privacy in the invaded
place."170 The United States Supreme Court has also stated that a
legitimate expectation of privacy exists when a person exhibits a
subjective expectation of privacy that "society is prepared to rec-
ognize as reasonable.""' This expectation of privacy must be "rea-
sonable in light of all the surrounding circumstances."172
When determining a social media user's expectation of privacy,
courts should consider the fact that, although Facebook's and oth-
er social media sites' privacy policies provide that the information
164. Id. (citing In re June 1979 Allegheny Cnty. Investigating Grand Jury, 415 A.2d 73
(Pa. 1980); In re "B", 394 A.2d 419 (Pa. 1979)).
165. Kintzer v. Petrone, 490 (Ct. Com. P1. Berks 1985) (emphasis added in original)
(citing Pa. CONST. amend. I, § 1).
166. See Stenger, 609 A.2d at 801 (setting forth the balancing test that is used to deter-
mine whether an intrusion into a privacy interest is justified).
167. Commonwealth v. Proetto, 771 A.2d 823 (Pa. Super. 2001).
168. Proetto, 771 A.2d at 830 (citing Commonwealth v. Ardestani, 736 A.2d 552, 556 (Pa.
1999)).
169. Id. (citing Ardestani, 736 A.2d at 556).
170. Id. (citing Commonwealth v. Brundidge, 620 A.2d 1115, 1117 (Pa. 1993)).
171. Id. (citing Brundidge, 620 A.2d at 1117) (quoting Katz v. U.S., 389 U.S. 347, 361
(1967) (Harlan, J., concurring)).
172. Proetto, 771 A.2d at 830-31 (citing Brundidge, 620 A.2d 1115, 1117 (Pa. 1993)).
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posted on the sites may be viewed or shared by others, many users
have at least a subjective expectation of privacy.17 If users did not
have this expectation of privacy, they probably would not post "in-
timate details of their lives."174 One possible reason that users feel
so comfortable posting details about their lives on Facebook is be-
cause the site creates an "intimate, confidential, and safe set-
ting."175  Most likely, the "intricate privacy controls" give users
this subjective expectation of privacy:"1 7 "Because of the availabil-
ity of detailed privacy controls, users may feel they are effectively
blocking any unwanted viewers from accessing their information,
and therefore, they maintain at least some expectation of priva-
cy."17 The difficult question a court will have to consider, if it has
not already disposed of the request under Rule 4011, is whether
the subjective expectation of privacy is reasonable.
Some Pennsylvania trial courts have held that a user has no
reasonable expectation of privacy or confidentiality in his or her
private social media site because in their policies, the social media
companies put users on notice that their information may be
shared or viewed by others. 7 s The court in McMillen stated, "it is
clear that no person choosing Myspace or Facebook as a communi-
cations forum could reasonably expect that his communications
would remain confidential . . . ."179 However, in McMillen, the
court never accounted for the fact that the only relevant public
information the plaintiff posted on his accounts were comments
about going on a fishing trip and attending the Daytona 500.18s
The court failed to consider how many people were able to view all
of the other content contained on the plaintiffs site, content to
which the court permitted the defendant unrestricted access.
Likewise, the court in Largent indicated that Facebook users have
no reasonable expectation of privacy because most of the infor-
173. Bub, supra note 142, at 1434.
174. See id.
175. See id. at 1435 (quoting James Grimmelmann, Saving Facebook, 94 IOWA L. REV.
1137, 1159-60 (2009)).
176. See id. (citing JOHN G. BROWNING, THE LAWYER's GUIDE TO SOCIAL NETWORKING
17-19 (2010)).
177. Id. (citing Payne, supra note 103, at 864).
178. McMillen v. Hummingbird, No. 113-2010 CD, 2010 Pa. Dist. & Cnty. Dec. LEXIS
270, *8-11 (Ct. Com. Pl. Jefferson Sept. 9, 2010); Largent v. Reed, No. 2009-1823, slip. op.
at 9 (Pa. Ct. Com. P1. Franklin Nov. 7, 2011); Zimmerman v. Weis Mkts., Inc., No. CV-09-
1535, 2010 Pa. Dist. & Cnty. Dec. LEXIS 187, *8-11 (Ct. Com. Pl. Northumberland May 19,
2011).
179. McMillen, 2010 Pa. Dist. & Cnty. Dec. LEXIS 270, at *9-10.
180. Id. at *2.
Vol. 51818
Discoverability of Social Media
mation posted on an account is shared with other people and may
also be shared with strangers.""' However, this is a very broad
statement, considering some content on social media sites might
only be shared with one other person or nobody at all. The judges
in McMillen, Zimmerman, and Largent all ordered the plaintiffs to
turn over their usernames and passwords, which would allow de-
fense counsel to access all of the plaintiffs' non-public pictures,
direct messages, and status updates dating back to when the
plaintiffs' Facebook pages were created.
Like the judges in the three aforementioned cases, another
commentator also argues that a user's subjective expectation of
privacy is unreasonable because "other users can disseminate the
content without obtaining consent from the user who posted it."182
The commentator likened social media users' expectation of priva-
cy in their private social media content to the expectation of priva-
cy contained in an individual's sent email or mailed letters."'3
Once the email or letter has been delivered to the recipient, the
expectation of privacy terminates.184
On the other hand, another commentator has suggested that,
"[a] blanket judicial interpretation that users have no expectation
of privacy in social-networking information threatens the social
benefits of the websites.""' This commentator argues that infor-
mation contained on social media "implicates privacy because it
involves the communication of personal information based on in-
dividual expression, relationship building, and a sense of commu-
nity."'s The commentator suggests that "courts should apply a
nuanced approach in analyzing social network privacy under
[Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 26(c)s']" because "different types
of social-networking information may have different levels of pri-
vacy implications.""8 It follows that not everything contained on a
social media page should be discoverable after a threshold show-
181. Largent, No. 2009-1823, slip. op. at *9.
182. North, supra note 136, at 1296.
183. Id. (citing Guest v. Leis, 255 F.3d 325, 333 (6th Cir. 2001)); see also Largent, No.
2009-1823, slip. op. at *9 n. 10.
184. North, supra note 136, at 1296 (citing Guest, 255 F.3d at 333); see also Common-
wealth v. Proetto, 771 A.2d 823, 831 (Pa. Super. 2001) (discussing how the expectation of
privacy is terminated once the email reaches its intended recipient)).
185. Payne, supra note 103, at 869.
186. Id. at 864.
187. FED. R. CIV. P. 26(c) is the equivalent of PA. R. CIV. P. 4012, which provides that
judges may issue protective orders limiting or preventing discovery when certain require-
ments are met.
188. Payne, supra note 103, at 867.
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ing of relevance.' As the commentator suggests, "[clourts should
consider determining whether a social-network user has an expec-
tation of privacy by looking at the type of information and whether
it is reasonable to expect that information to remain private."90
When doing so, "[tihe relevant factors that courts should consider
are where the information exists, what types of people have access
to the information, and whether any social dynamics exist that
constrain or facilitate dissemination."' In particular, when de-
termining whether the specific type of content deserves privacy
protection, the commentator suggests that "courts should look at
the nuts and bolts of the social-networking website: where the in-
formation was located, who is the receiver of the information, how
the information was stored, and whether any internal policy or
norm created an expectation that other users would not dissemi-
nate the information."192
If a court determines that a user does not have a reasonable ex-
pectation of privacy for the private content, the court should con-
sider an order that requires the parties to enter into a confidenti-
ality agreement regarding the private social media content.'93
Such agreements may alleviate the privacy concerns discussed
above. Also, in order to limit the privacy concerns, the court may
enter a protective order under Rule 4012.
Ultimately, if requests to obtain an opponent's username and
password or an authorization to release all of his or her private
social media content are not stricken under Rule 4011 or for pri-
vacy reasons, a court should reject the requests because they are
overly broad and unreasonably calculated to lead to the discovery
of admissible evidence.
189. For example, irrelevant and private direct messages with close friends or family
should not be discoverable.
190. Payne, supra note 103, at 867.
191. Id. at 870 (citing Lior Jacob Strahilevitz, A Social Networks Theory of Privacy, 72
U. CHi. L. REV. 919, 970-71 (2005)).
192. Id.
193. See Coy-Burt v. Hoskins, No. 09090182700046 (Pa. Ct. Com. Pl. Phila. Apr. 28,
2010) (order granting defendant's motion for reconsideration of defendant's motion to com-
pel), discussed supra, note 19.
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2. The Reasonableness and Breadth of the Particular Dis-
covery Request and the Likelihood that It Will Lead to
Relevant Information
When looking at this factor, in accordance with Rule 4003.1(b),
the court should ask whether the information sought (the private
content) appears "reasonably calculated" to lead to relevant evi-
dence. Obviously, a request that asks an opponent to produce his
or her social media usernames and passwords or to sign an au-
thorization to release all of the information contained on the social
media page may lead to admissible evidence. This is because the
term relevant is construed broadly under Rule 4003.1194 and a us-
er's social media page may contain content regarding the physical
activities that he or she participates in or his or her state of mind
that might contradict his or her claims of damages. However, dis-
covery requests that cast too wide of a net and seek too much ir-
relevant information along with the potentially relevant infor-
mation should be disallowed as being unreasonably calculated."'
As one commentator has argued, "U] ust like any other kind of
evidence, a discovery request for information on a social network
page should be rejected as overly broad if it is unlimited in scope,
or not related to an alleged injury or claim for recovery. The rele-
vant inquiry is whether the discovery is so broad that it amounts
to a fishing expedition."" In recent amendments to the Rules of
Civil Procedure on discovery, an explanatory note was added to
Rule 4009.11, which states: "A request seeking electronically
stored information should be as specific as possible. Limitations
as to time and scope are favored . . . ."1' Thus, a reasonable dis-
covery request must be narrowly tailored in order to produce the
relevant content with the least amount of irrelevant (and poten-
194. See, e.g., George v. Schirra, 814 A.2d 202, 205 (Pa. Super. Ct. 2002) ("the relevancy
standard during discovery is necessarily broader than it is for admission at trial"); Schwab
v. Milks, 8 Pa. D. & C.4th 557, 559 (Ct. Com. Pl. Lackawanna 1990) (indicating that the
term "relevant" under Pa. R. CIv. P. 4003.1 has a greater breadth and scope and carries a
more flexible standard than "relevant" for purposes of admissibility of evidence at trial).
195. See In re Thompson's Estate, 206 A.2d 21, 28 (Pa. 1965) ("'[Flishing expeditions' are
not to be countenanced under the guise of discovery.").
196. Ward, supra note 135, at 582-83.
197. PA. R. Civ. P. 4009.11 (amendment, effective August 1, 2012). The recently adopted
amendments to the Pennsylvania Rules of Civil Procedure govern e-discovery practice and
specifically affect Rules 4009 and 4011. See Michael Broadbent, Pennsylvania Announces
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tially embarrassing) content along with it. Requests for
usernames, passwords, and signed authorizations that consent to
the release of all of the user's private content are neither narrowly
tailored nor "reasonably" calculated to produce only the relevant
content."1s Rather, these types of requests are overly broad, un-
limited in time and scope and amount to nothing but a fishing ex-
pedition.
In McMillen, the court disregarded the fact that the scope of
discovery should be limited to relevant information and not to just
"any information.""' Likewise, in Romano v. Steelcase Inc.,200 a
New York trial court case that Pennsylvania judges have relied on
when deciding the issue,20 1 the judge also overlooked rules of civil
procedure in an overly zealous effort to obtain information that
might have contradicted the plaintiffs claims.202 As one commen-
tator correctly opined, the judges in Romano and McMillen
"demonstrated profound neglect of the very sensitive nature of
much of the content stored on a user's [social networking site] as
well as abandonment of the routine discovery procedures that
have been followed by attorneys for years" by ordering the plain-
tiffs to turn over their entire social media accounts thereby giving
their opponents unfettered access.203
198. It is true that the party objecting to discovery bears the burden of establishing that
the requested information or documents are not relevant. See Walsh v. Generations Mgmt.
Servs., LLC, No. 09 CV 5715, 2011 WL 1131485 (Pa. Ct. Com. Pl. Lackawanna Mar. 7,
2011) (internal citations omitted). A social media user can easily point to the unreasona-
bleness of the request by pointing to all of the posts, pictures, and direct messages with
friends that are not remotely relevant to a fact at issue.
199. Bub, supra note 142, at 1455.
200. 907 N.Y.S.2d 650 (N.Y. Sup. Ct. 2010).
201. See Zimmerman v. Weis Mkts., Inc., No. CV-09-1535, 2011 Pa. D. & C. LEXIS 187,
at *4-9 (Ct. Com. Pl. Northumberland May 19, 2011); Largent v. Reed, No. 2009-1823, slip.
op. at 8 (Pa. Ct. Com. Pl. Franklin Nov. 7, 2011).
202. Romano, 907 N.Y.S.2d at 653. In Romano, plaintiff brought a personal injury suit
for damages, claiming that she had a loss of enjoyment of life and could no longer partici-
pate in certain activities due to the accident. Id. The defendant reviewed the plaintiffs
public information on the plaintiffs Facebook and Myspace accounts and found that the
plaintiff traveled to Florida and Pennsylvania and actually had an active lifestyle. Id.
After the plaintiff refused to sign an authorization consenting to the release of her social
media content, the defendant filed a motion to compel. Id. The court indicated that it was
reasonable to infer from the limited public postings that her private postings may also
contain material and information that were relevant to her claims or that may lead to other
admissible evidence. Id. at 432. The court indicated that the defendant's need for the in-
formation outweighed the plaintiffs privacy concerns. Id. The court ultimately granted the
motion to compel and ordered the plaintiff to sign an authorization. Id at 435. The court
disregarded the fact that, by ordering the plaintiff to sign an authorization releasing all of
the content, an abundance of irrelevant and potentially embarrassing information and
content would also be released. Id.
203. Bub, supra note 142, at 1455.
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These judges are traveling down a dangerous and slippery slope.
If a defendant discovers just one relevant email between friends in
a response to requests for production, what is next? Are trial
judges now going to order litigants to turn over the usernames and
passwords to their private email accounts? After all, access to the
entire email account may lead to relevant information regarding a
plaintiffs claimed injuries and damages. 204 Such a request, how-
ever, would be unreasonable, atypical, and highly intrusive. A
typical discovery request is one that "requires the information-
seeking litigant to issue a production request so that the produc-
ing party can gather the evidence, cull it for relevance and privi-
lege, and then produce the relevant non-privileged materials."205
One scholar summed it up best: "It would be a highly intrusive
system if the normal procedure was, instead of a party producing
its own documents, the other party's attorneys enter [ed] your
house or business, look[ed] through all your papers and effects,
and [took] away the material that in their judgment was relevant
and non-privileged."206
This comment does not suggest an all out ban on the discovery
of private social media content. After all, social media sites may
contain a great amount of relevant information, and the purpose
of discovery is to ascertain the truth in order to have a fair trial on
the merits.207 This comment instead suggests that more reasona-
ble and conventional methods are available to obtain private social
media content.
Under certain circumstances, requests for authorizations allow-
ing a social media company to release private content may not be
unreasonable. If a party uses this method of discovery, the court
should ensure the authorization is as specific as possible and lim-
ited in time and scope.208 First, the authorization should cover
only the relevant time period and not date back to the inception of
the social media account. Moreover, the authorization should be
204. This is not to suggest that there are not some situations in which all email commu-
nications actually would be relevant and required to be turned over to the opponent.
205. Bub, supra note 142, at 1455 (citing Boyden, supra note 158).
206. Id. (quoting Boyden, supra note 158).
207. See McGovern v. Hosp. Serv. Ass'n of Northeastern Pa., 785 A.2d 1012, 1015 (Pa.
Super. Ct. 2001) ("the purpose of the discovery rules is to prevent surprise and unfairness
and to allow a fair trial on the merits" (citing Dominick v. Hanson, 753 A.2d 824, 826 (Pa.
Super. Ct. 2000))).
208. See explanatory note amended to PA. R. CIV. P. 4009.11 (effective Aug. 1, 2012) ("A
request seeking electronically stored information should be as specific as possible. Limita-
tions as to time and scope are favored.. . .").
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limited in scope, only requesting certain types of social media con-
tent. This is where the "threshold rule" that has been emerging in
the Pennsylvania trial courts and other jurisdictions may have
some merit.209 It would not be unreasonable under the Pennsylva-
nia Rules of Civil Procedure for a party that has viewed relevant
photographs on the publicly viewable page to request an authori-
zation to release only the private photographs for the relevant time
period. Direct messages, instant messages, status updates, com-
ments, and other content should not be included in the authoriza-
tion.210 This would reduce the chance that the authorization
would carry too much irrelevant or potentially embarrassing in-
formation with it. Although this type of discovery method may be
reasonable under some circumstances, a more reasonable way to
obtain private social media content exists and should be the meth-
od preferred by courts.
The most reasonable way a party can obtain private social me-
dia content is by requesting relevant content directly from the op-
ponent. A number of courts have agreed with this premise. For
example, in Mackelprang v. Fidelity National Title Agency of Ne-
vada, Inc.,211 after denying the defendant's request for a signed
authorization that would allow the defendant to access plaintiffs
private Myspace messages, the court indicated that the "proper
method" for obtaining relevant information is to serve "properly
limited requests for production of relevant [Myspace] communica-
tions."212 Similarly, in Held v. Ferrellgas, Inc.,213 the court indicat-
ed that the defendant mitigated the plaintiffs privacy concerns by
allowing the plaintiff "to download and produce the information
209. Other jurisdictions that have recognized the "threshold rule" but declined to order
the plaintiff to sign an authorization include: Tompkins v. Detroit Metro. Airport, 278
F.R.D. 387 (E.D. Mich. 2012) (refusing to order defendant to sign an authorization finding
that the requests sought irrelevant information and were overly broad); McCann v. Har-
leysville Ins. Co. of N.Y., 78 A.D.3d 1524, 1525 (N.Y. Sup. Ct. 2012) (indicating that the
defendant failed to establish a factual predicate with respect to relevancy and denied the
motion to compel signed authorizations).
210. Likewise, if the page contains a relevant publicly viewable status update, then only
the user's status updates for the relevant time period should be released and not private
pictures, direct messages, or any other information on the account.
211. 2:06-cv-00788-JCM-GWF, 2007 WL 119149, at *2 (D. Nev. Jan 9, 2007).
212. Mackelprang, 2007 WL 119149 at *8. The court stated that "Inlothing in this Order
prevents Defendants from serving such discovery requests on Plaintiff to produce her
Myspace.com private messages that contain information regarding her sexual harassment
allegations in this lawsuit or which discuss her alleged emotional distress and the cause(s)
thereof." Id.
213. Held v. Ferrellgas, Inc., 10 2393 EFM, 2011 WL 3896513 (D. Kan. Aug. 31, 2011).
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himself, rather than providing login information."214 In Held, the
court granted the motion to compel because the defendant was not
"seeking unfettered or unlimited access" to the plaintiffs Facebook
account.215
In Offenback v. L.M. Bowman, Inc.,216 the court conducted its
own in camera review to determine which of the plaintiffs photo-
graphs and posts were relevant to his claims of damages and inju-
ries.217 In a footnote, the court indicated that it was perplexed as
to why it was asked to complete an in camera review and pointed
out that the defense should have narrowed the discovery requests
if it wanted to discover the potentially relevant information.218
The court indicated that it would have been both possible and
proper for the plaintiff to review his own Facebook account to de-
termine the relevant information.219
In EEOC v. Simply Storage Management,220 the defense, in its
requests for production of documents, asked the claimants to pro-
duce copies of all the content contained on their Facebook and
Myspace pages, including all of the photographs and videos posted
by the claimants and all "status updates, messages, wall com-
ments, causes joined, groups joined, activity streams, blog entries,
details, blubs, comments and applications" for the relevant time
period.221 In deciding on the motion to compel, the court deter-
mined that discovery of private social media discovery is, in fact,
214. Held, 2011 WL 3896513 at *1.
215. Id.
216. 1:10 CV 1789, 2011 WL 2491371 (M.D. Pa. June 22, 2011).
217. Offenback, 2011 WL 2491371 at *2-3. After conducting the in camera inspection,
the court indicated that, with the exceptions of a few photographs, the plaintiffs Facebook
account revealed little information "beyond routine communications with family and
friends, an interest in bluegrass and country music, a photography hobby, sporadic obser-
vations about current events, and a passion for the Philadelphia Phillies." Id. at *3.
218. Id. at *3 n.3.
219. Id. The court also indicated that the defense "backed away from their initial posi-
tion that they should be entitled to a general release of all information and data from
Plaintiffs social networking sites, and that instead of engaging in a broad fishing expedi-
tion, were attempting to discover [the] potentially relevant information such as that de-
scribed in their ... letter to the Court." Id. The court went on to state that
If the Defendants had, in fact, narrowed their discovery requests in this fashion, we
believe it would have been both possible and proper for Plaintiff to have undertaken
the initial review of his Facebook account to determine whether it contained poten-
tially relevant and responsive information, and thereafter to solicit the Court's assis-
tance if a dispute remained as to whether he should be required to produce the in-
formation identified.
Id.
220. 270 F.R.D. 430 (S.D. Ind. 2010).
221. EEOC, 270 F.R.D. at 432.
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allowed, but the scope has to be limited in some way.222 Although
the defendant's requests were limited in time, the court essential-
ly rewrote them to include the word "relevant" after the word "all"
so that the requests had a proper scope.223 The court determined
that the proper scope under the particular facts comprised any
content that "reveal[ed], refer[ed], or relate[d] to any emotion feel-
ing or mental state, as well as communications that that re-
veal[ed], refer[ed], or relate[d] to events that could reasonably be
expected to produce a significant emotion, feeling or mental state"
for the relevant time period.224 It then gave the parties guidance
on what it would consider relevant under the circumstances of the
case and told the plaintiff/claimant to err in favor of production
when determining what is relevant.225
The above cases indicate that the proper way to conduct social
media discovery is with requests that are narrowly tailored to
produce relevant information directly from the opponent and
which are reasonably calculated to lead to relevant evidence. The
requests should be specific and related to a fact at issue. As one
commentator suggests, "[in terms of discovery requests, refrain
from being excessively global (i.e., 'all contents of any and all so-
cial media profiles of John Doe') ... Instead, be specific in what is
sought, and tie it to the claims of defenses in the case. 226
It should be noted that Facebook actually makes it easy for a
user to provide relevant private content in response to an oppo-
nent's request for production of documents. Facebook has a fea-
ture that allows the user to download a copy of the information
that he or she has shared on the site.227 Specifically, the user is
able to download a file that includes the user's profile information;
wall/timeline posts and content that the user and user's friends
have posted to the user's wall/timeline; photos and videos that the
user has uploaded to his or her account; the user's friend list;
222. Id. at 434.
223. See id. at 436.
224. Id.
225. Id. at 436.
226. John G. Browning, Articles, Digging for the Digital Dirt: Discovery and Use of Evi-
dence From Social Media Sites, 14 SMU SCI. & TECH. L. REV. 465, 473-74 (2011) (citations
omitted) ("For example, instead of just a blanket request for all content, seek 'all online
profiles, postings, messages (including, but not limited to, tweets, replies, re-tweets, direct
messages, status updates, wall comments, groups joined, activity streams, and blog en-
tries), photographs, videos and online communication' relating to particular claims, allega-
tions of mental anguish or emotional distress, defenses, et cetera.").
227. FACEBOOK, Download Your Information,
http://www.facebook.com/help/?page=116481065103985 (last visited July 11, 2012).
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"notes" that the user has created; "events" to which the user
RSVP'd; the user's sent and received messages; and any other
comments that the user or his or her friends have made on the
user's posts, photos, and other profile/timeline content.228  This
feature makes the private content easily accessible and obtainable
to litigants. Accordingly, it makes it easy for the user to comb
over his or her own social media content to determine what is rel-
evant and to respond to the opponent's specific requests appropri-
ately.
A concern with this method is whether the requesting parties
will actually receive all of the relevant private content from the
opponent in response to their discovery requests. Any argument
of this type should fail. As with all discovery requests, litigants
have to rely on the other side to produce requested documents or
answers to interrogatories in good faith. In any type of discovery
request, the opposing party could potentially withhold requested
information. That is how discovery works. If the responding par-
ty fails to respond properly to a discovery request, he or she could
face sanctions or penalties of perjury, because all responses must
be "verified" by the responding party under penalties of perjury.2 29
In Simply Storage, in response to this type of argument, the court
stated, "[llawyers are frequently called upon to make judgment
calls-in good faith and consistent with their obligations as officers
of the court-about what information is responsive to another par-
ty's discovery requests."230 The court stated that parties have cer-
tain options if they believe that the other side's production falls
short, which include questioning the opponent and his or her
counsel further in depositions about what was and was not pro-
duced.231 As indicated in Mackelprang, a refusal by a plaintiff to
produce relevant and discoverable content could be grounds for
imposing sanctions. 23 2 In Rozell v. Ross Holst,23 a case dealing
with private email communications, the court stated:
228. Id.
229. See PA. R. CIV. P. 4006(a)(1) ("Answers to interrogatories shall be in writing and
verified."); PA. R. CIV. P. 4009.12(c) ("The [response] shall be signed and verified by the
party making it . . . ."); PA. R. CIV. P. 76 ("'verified,' when used in reference to a written
statement of fact by the signer, means supported by oath or affirmation or made subject to
the penalties of 18 Pa.C.S. § 4904 relating to unsworn falsification to authorities"); PA. R.
CIV. P. 4019 (a party may face sanctions when it fails to properly answer or respond to
discovery requests).
230. EEOC, 270 F.R.D. at 436.
231. Id.
232. Mackelprang v. Fidelity Nat'l Title Agency of Nev., No. 2:06-cv-00788-JCM-GWF,
2007 WL 119149, at *8 (D. Nev. Jan. 9, 2007).
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The defendants are correct that an interested party cannot be
the 'final arbiter' of relevance. But counsel for the producing
party is the judge of relevance in the first interest. Discovery
in our adversarial system is based on a good faith response to
demands for production by an attorney constrained by the
Federal Rules and by ethical obligations. Where the parties
disagree as to the contours of relevance in connection with
particular discovery demands, they present their dispute to
the court, as the parties have done here. When a party can
demonstrate that an adversary may be wrongfully withhold-
ing relevant information, it can seek relief . . . .234
Another way a party can address this issue is to ask the court to
conduct its own in camera inspection to determine what infor-
mation is relevant on the user's social media page.235 If a court
has the time and resources to conduct an in camera review for rel-
evant information or to assure a party has responded appropriate-
ly, this method would not be unreasonable, for it would alleviate
the privacy concerns associated with the private content. In one
case, in an effort to expedite the discovery, a judge went so far as
to offer to "friend" the witnesses who were friends with the plain-
tiff, find the relevant content, and thereafter disseminate the rele-
vant information contained on their sites to both sides.236 It is un-
likely, however, that these approaches will be used by many
courts. In Zimmerman, a request by the plaintiff for an in camera
approach was "flatly rejected as an unfair burden" on the court. 237
Courts simply do not have the time or resources necessary to com-
plete a thorough review of a party's social media account.238
In sum, when a court considers how social media websites work,
along with the rules and factors discussed above, the court should
determine that the most proper and reasonable way for a party to
conduct discovery of private social media is by requesting relevant
information directly from the opponent in properly drafted re-
233. 05 Civ. 2936(JGK)JCF, 2006 WL 163143 (S.D.N.Y. Jan. 20, 2006).
234. Rozell, 2006 WL 163143 at *4.
235. See, e.g., Offenback v. L.M. Bowman, Inc., 1:10 CV 1789, 2011 WL 2491371 (M.D.
Pa. June 22, 2011); Bass v. Miss Porter's Sch., No. 3:08cv1807 (JBA), 2009 WL 3724968
(Oct. 27, 2009).
236. See Barnes v. CUS Nashville, LLC, No. 3:09 cv 00764, 2010 WL 2265668 (M.D.
Tenn. June 3, 2010).
237. Zimmerman v. Weis Mkts., Inc. No. CV-09-1535, 2011 Pa. D. & C. LEXIS 187, at *2
n.2 (Ct. Com. Pl. Northumberland May 19, 2011).
238. See id.
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quests for production of documents. For example, a proper discov-
ery request for the fact scenario laid out in the Introduction of this
Comment would have been a request that sought printouts of "any
pictures, status updates, comments, messages, or profile infor-
mation contained on Plaintiffs' Facebook and Twitter accounts
that relates to, depicts, characterizes, details or illustrates Patty
Plaintiff partaking in any physical activity or social event since
the date of the accident." 239 In response, Patty Plaintiff would
have been obligated to send the pictures and status updates that
indicated that she recently partook in physical activities and so-
cial events. As indicated above, Facebook actually has a tool that
makes it easy for social media users to provide this requested con-
tent. Nevertheless, in some situations, authorizations that are
limited in time and scope and seek only specific content that is
potentially relevant may also be reasonable. On the other hand,
discovery requests that seek opponents' usernames and passwords
are never reasonable and should never be allowed.
IV. CONCLUSION
The discoverability of private social media has not been widely
litigated in Pennsylvania. There have only been six Court of
Common Pleas' judges that have issued an opinion regarding the
matter and an appellate court has yet to address the issue. 24 0 The
239. For another example of a properly drafted discovery request, see Browning, supra
note 226.
240. As indicated in note 13, supra, Judge Wettick of the Allegheny County Court of
Common Pleas and Judge Bianco of the Indiana County Court of Common Pleas issued
their opinions and orders after a majority of this Comment was completed; therefore, their
opinions and orders were not discussed in the body of this Comment. See Trail v. Lesko,
No. GD-10-017249, 2012 WL 2864004 (Pa. Ct. Com. Pl. Allegheny July 5, 2012) (order and
opinion denying both plaintiffs and defendant's motions to compel); Simms v. Lewis, No.
11961 CD 2011, 2012 WL 6755098 (Pa. Ct. Com. P. Indiana Oct. 10, 2012) (opinion and
order granting in part and denying in part defendant's motion to compel).
In Trail, Judge Wettick's opinion denied both a plaintiffs and a defendant's motion
to compel access to the other's Facebook account. Trail, 2012 WL 2864004, at Part I. The
plaintiffs motion to compel sought information that was not relevant to the only issue that
remained in the case, damages, and therefore, was held to be an unreasonable intrusion
under PA. R. CIV. P. 4011(b). Id. at Part V, A. Likewise, the defendant's motion was denied
because the public photographs he gleaned from the plaintiffs public profile were not in-
consistent with the plaintiffs alleged injuries. Id. at Part V, B. Judge Wettick based both
rulings on PA. R. CIV. P. 4011(b) and indicated that allowing a litigant full access to his or
her opponent's Facebook account is intrusive "because the opposing party is likely to gain
access to a great deal of information that has nothing to do with the litigation and may
cause embarrassment if viewed by persons who are not 'Friends.'" Id. at Summary. He
indicated that private Facebook content is protected by Rule 4011 when the opposing party
"has not shown a sufficient likelihood that such discovery will provide relevant evidence,
829
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four opinions discussed in this Comment that have ruled on the
matter have determined that there must be a threshold showing of
relevant material contained on the litigant's public page before the
opponent can have access to the private content. Inexplicably,
when this threshold showing is made, some Pennsylvania trial
judges have been setting dangerous precedent by ordering the par-
ty to furnish his or her usernames and passwords or signed au-
thorizations, which allows the opposing party unfettered access to
a user's entire social media account.241
Private social media evidence is unlike any other evidence, and
courts need to consider the different attributes of the social media
sites. Although private social media content should be discovera-
ble, the Pennsylvania trial courts that have granted opponents
unfettered access have not been adhering to the Pennsylvania
Rules of Civil Procedure or to the way discovery is typically con-
not otherwise available, that will support the case of the party seeking discovery." Id.
Here, both discovery requests were denied because the intrusions were not offset by "any
showing the discovery would assist the requesting party in presenting its case." Id.
In Simms, the plaintiff was injured in an automobile accident and claimed that she
suffered "mental and physical anguish, inconvenience, and deprivation of the ordinary
pleasures of life" as well as bodily injuries. Simms, 2012 WL 6755098. The defendant
discovered that the plaintiff had Facebook, myYearbook, and MySpace accounts. Id. On
the plaintiffs myYearbook account, she posted: "Chillin with my girl tonight. were gonna
do some Zumba Fitness :) so exited!!! HTC :p." Id. Because of this post, the defendant
requested the plaintiffs usernames and passwords for all three accounts in order to view
the private content. Id. Once the plaintiff declined to provide her log-in information, the
defendant filed a motion to compel. Id. Relying on Zimmerman, and applying the thresh-
old rule, the court found that the information contained on the plaintiffs myYearbook ac-
count was discoverable. Id. However, since the defendant was unable to point to any rele-
vant public postings on the plaintiffs Facebook and MySpace accounts, the judge denied
the defendant access to those two sites. Id. Deviating from what the other Pennsylvania
trial courts have done (i.e. ordering a litigant to turn over his or her log-in information),
Judge Bianco somewhat limited his holding. Id. The plaintiff was only required to "coordi-
nate an agreed upon date, time, and location where Plaintiff will access her myYearbook
account in the presence of counsel for [the defendant]" and to not delete any of the infor-
mation on that account until after that time. Id.
241. Since the completion of this Comment, at least two more Pennsylvania trial courts
have decided the issue with written opinions denying discovery of private social media. See
Hoy v. Holmes, No. S-57-12 (Pa. Ct. Com. Pl. Schuylkill Jan. 31, 2013) (opinion and order
denying defendant's motion to compel); Brogan v. Rosenn, Jenkins & Greenwald, LLP., No.
08 CV 6048, 2013 WL 1742689 (Pa. Ct. Com. PI. Lackawanna Apr. 22, 2013) (memorandum
and order denying plaintiffs motion to compel). In the recent and comprehensive opinion
by Judge Nealon of the Lackawanna County Court of Common Pleas, the trial court cor-
rectly denied the plaintiffs' request to compel discovery of an opponent's Facebook
username and password in part by considering the factors set forth in this Comment, stat-
ing: "A discovery request seeking carte blanche access to private social networking infor-
mation is overly intrusive, would cause unreasonable embarrassment and burden in con-
travention of PA. R. Civ. P. 4011(b), and is not properly tailored 'with reasonable particular-
ity' as required by the Pennsylvania Rules of Civil Procedure." Brogan, 2013 WL 1742689,
at Part II(B)(2).
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ducted. Moreover, courts must consider privacy concerns when
deciding this issue. The most reasonable and appropriate method
of discovering private social media content is to request the rele-
vant content directly from the opponent. The opponent has a duty
to furnish this relevant information to the other side or face sanc-
tions. In some situations, authorizations limited in time and scope
may also be reasonable.
Ultimately, the scope of private social media content discovery
needs to be resolved by an appellate court. The court will need to
consider a user's privacy concerns as well as the reasonableness
and scope of the particular discovery request. Until an appellate
court decides the proper scope of social media discovery, litigants
need to be aware that if they post relevant information on their
public pages, they may be forced to provide an opponent full access
to their private account.

